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ABSTRACT 
Entrepreneurs drive economic prosperity in a country when they produce value through 
innovation. But, not all entrepreneurship is productive - entrepreneurs can channel their energies 
towards unproductive (rent-shifting) activities ranging from unregistered businesses to criminal 
enterprise. The core proposition of this dissertation is that a country’s socio-cultural values and 
norms determine the likelihood of an individual undertaking entrepreneurial activity of any type 
while rules and regulations shift entrepreneurial activity toward productive or unproductive 
behavior. This dissertation integrates the socio-cultural literature with the rules and regulations 
literature to explain the amount of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in a country by 
predicting both the total supply of entrepreneurial activity in a country and its allocation into 
productive and unproductive applications. In this dissertation, I investigate why the amount of 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship varies across countries by analyzing the amount of 
entrepreneurship and its allocation in 25 countries between 2004 and 2008. My findings show 
that pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values drive both productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship and that the most favorable mix of entrepreneurship actually derives not from 
the most well-defined property rights, most lenient bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur, most 
open trade policies nor most flexible labor markets, but rather from moderate levels of those 
rules and regulations. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 Entrepreneurs drive economic prosperity in a country when they produce value through 
innovation. The entrepreneurship literature overall views entrepreneurial activity as socially 
beneficial because entrepreneurs are the actors who create organizations that yield new jobs, 
increase trade, and generate or accelerate innovative ideas (Arzeni, 1998; Bates and Dunham, 
1993; McDougall and Oviatt, 1997) which each in turn leads to economic growth. But, not all 
entrepreneurship is productive – entrepreneurs can channel their energies toward unproductive 
activities ranging from litigation to criminal enterprise (Baumol, 1990). This dissertation seeks to 
explain and predict the conditions that enhance productive entrepreneurship while mitigating 
unproductive entrepreneurship.   
 In this dissertation, I investigate why the amount of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship varies across countries. My core proposition is that a country’s social values 
and norms determine the likelihood of an individual undertaking entrepreneurial activity of any 
type, either productive or unproductive, while rules and regulations shift entrepreneurial activity 
toward productive or unproductive behavior. My main contribution is integrating the socio-
cultural literature with the rules and regulations literature into a model that explains the amount 
of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in a country by predicting both the total supply 
of entrepreneurial activity in a country and its allocation into productive and unproductive 
applications. Doing so extends both literatures, while providing better guidance to managers and 
policy makers. 
 The socio-cultural literature on entrepreneurship (e.g., McGrath et al., 1992) examines 
how differences in societal values across countries lead to different levels of productive 
entrepreneurial activity, but ignores the potential for that effort to be channeled into unproductive 
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entrepreneurship. In contrast, the rules and regulations literature posits that entrepreneurship can 
be allocated toward productive or unproductive (or even destructive) applications depending on 
the structure of payoff or incentives, but ignores possible differences in the supply by holding the 
supply of entrepreneurs as fixed. Consequently, neither literature in isolation explains the 
variation in total entrepreneurship across countries. By bringing the literatures together, as 
illustrated in figure 1, I am better equipped to explain the amount of total entrepreneurship in a 
country by estimating both the total supply of entrepreneurial activity and its allocation into 
productive and unproductive activities. 
 I make three additional inter-related contributions. First, I build on Baumol’s (1990) 
broad reference to the set of rules “that undergoes significant changes from one period to another 
and helps dictate the ultimate effects on the economy via the allocation of entrepreneurial 
resources” (page 894), and identify a specific set of institutional factors that steer the allocation 
of entrepreneurial resources. Second, my model and data allow me to add to the very small body 
of work that empirically tests Baumol’s (1990) widely cited theoretical papers. Doing so leads to 
my third contribution, helping resolve a tension in the economic literature on entrepreneurship - 
do poor institutions, e.g., over-regulation, suppress total entrepreneurial activity, per Djankov et 
al. (2002), or do they shift the allocation of that effort from productive to unproductive 
application, per Baumol (1990). 
 Additionally, this dissertation expands the empirical basis for studying entrepreneurship. 
I combine multiple established data sources specific to entrepreneurship and more general 
sources to develop reliable indicators for socio-cultural factors, the regulatory environment, and 
the amount of both productive and unproductive entrepreneurship across 5 years in 25 countries.  
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Determinants of the Amount: Socio-cultural Literature 
 The predisposition toward entrepreneurship varies between countries (Muller and 
Thomas, 2000). The socio-cultural literature posits that this variation results from differences in 
societal norms that shape the degree to which the qualities and actions required to pursue 
entrepreneurship are valued or at least tolerated. These norms act on individuals within each 
country, creating a central tendency within the population as a whole that is more or less 
consistent with pursuing entrepreneurial activity. While numerous factors influence a given 
individual’s tendency to engage in entrepreneurial activity, countries with more pro-
entrepreneurial values and beliefs will have more individuals inclined towards entrepreneurship 
and as a result generate more overall levels of national entrepreneurship. 
 The socio-cultural literature examines how differences in societal values across countries 
lead to different levels of productive entrepreneurial activity, but ignores the potential for that 
effort to be channeled into unproductive entrepreneurship. The socio-cultural literature provides 
us with the amount (supply) of entrepreneurs but not the allocation.  
 Proposition 1: Both productive and unproductive entrepreneurship can result from the 
 same pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values. 
Allocation of Entrepreneurship  
Baumol (1990) and others (e.g., Murphy, 1991) propose that entrepreneurial effort, as 
defined as carrying out new combinations (Schumpeter, 1934), can be allocated among 
productive (rent-creating), unproductive (rent-shifting1) or destructive (rent-destroying) forms. 
The determinants of the allocation of entrepreneurial effort are influenced by the relative payoffs, 
                                                           
1 The literature (e.g., Desai & Acs, 2007) refers to unproductive entrepreneurship as ‘rent-seeking’ but in general all 
entrepreneurs (productive, unproductive or destructive) are seeking rents so in this dissertation I adopt the phrase 
‘rent-shifting’ to unproductive behaviors. Unproductive entrepreneurs are shifting rents instead of creating new 
value.  
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in a manner that corresponds to the variations in the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990). 
Entrepreneurs will allocate their efforts toward productive activities when the incentive system 
makes being a productive entrepreneur more beneficial than unproductive. Theorists of the 
allocation of entrepreneurship hold the supply of entrepreneurs constant and accordingly neglect 
that some countries may value entrepreneurship more than others and consequently have a higher 
quantity of potential entrepreneurs. The allocation of entrepreneurship literature provides us with 
the concept that entrepreneurship can be allocated among different activities but does not look at 
how that allocation may correspond with the supply. Furthermore, the theory broadly references 
rules and regulations but does not provide specific factors that may determine the shift of 
entrepreneurial activities toward productive or unproductive allocations.  
Specific Determinants of the Allocation: Rules & Regulations  
 The regulatory environment in which an entrepreneur resides significantly influences his 
allocation of entrepreneurial effort (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008) because it determines the costs 
and benefits of productive entrepreneurship. In deciding whether to pursue productive or 
unproductive entrepreneurship, an entrepreneur will consider the costs he must incur to pursue 
productive entrepreneurship and the opportunity to capture rents from his efforts.  
When the benefits of being a productive entrepreneur are constrained and when it is 
difficult for the entrepreneur to capture the value of his productive efforts then the entrepreneur 
will be more likely to allocate his efforts toward unproductive behaviors (Murphy et al., 1991). 
Extant research shows that countries with high regulatory costs of productive entrepreneurship 
have lower levels of productive entrepreneurship and higher levels of corruption (e.g., Botero et 
al., 2004; Klapper et al., 2006). Conversely countries with low regulatory costs of productive 
entrepreneurship have higher levels of productive entrepreneurship and lower levels of 
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corruption (Djankov et al., 2002; Minniti, 2008). Protection and rewards for an entrepreneur’s 
novel ideas with minimal efforts to act on those ideas enables the greatest appropriation of rents 
and encourages productive entrepreneurship. Accordingly, in this dissertation optimal rules and 
regulations are those that provide the maximum ability for the productive entrepreneur to capture 
rents from his efforts at the minimal possible cost.  
Proposition 2: The closer to optimal the rules and regulations in a country the greater 
the impact of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on levels of productive 
entrepreneurship relative to unproductive entrepreneurship. 
In this dissertation, I identify five institutional factors that shift the allocation of 
entrepreneurial resources. The factors are administrative barriers to entry, property rights and 
enforcement of contracts, bankruptcy laws, trade policies, and labor markets. These specific 
factors are drawn from the economic regulation literature and act as catalysts for when costs are 
low or deterrents when costs are high for productive entrepreneurship (e.g., Djankov et al., 
2002).  
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CHAPTER 2: THE SUPPLY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP - THEORY AND 
HYPOTHESES     
 
 I put forward that the same pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values drive both 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. The socio-cultural literature posits that variation 
in the predisposition toward entrepreneurship across countries results from differences in societal 
norms that shape the degree to which the qualities and actions required to pursue 
entrepreneurship are valued or at least tolerated (Muller and Thomas, 2000). These norms act on 
individuals within each country, creating a central tendency within the population as a whole that 
is more or less consistent with pursuing entrepreneurial activity. While numerous factors 
influence a given individual’s tendency to engage in entrepreneurial activity, countries with more 
pro-entrepreneurial values and beliefs will generally have more individuals inclined towards 
entrepreneurship and as a result generate more overall levels of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship2. I identify four pro-entrepreneurial, allocative-neutral, socio-cultural value 
categories - tolerance for ambiguity, egalitarian value system, acceptance of individuality, and 
portrayal of entrepreneurship by media - from which the propensity within a nation for 
entrepreneurial behavior can be explained.   
 This section builds from the theory of culture as defined by Hofstede (1980, 1991, and 
2001) because it is the most widely used cultural indicators in the international business literature 
(Kirkman et al. 2006) and provides a “clear articulation of differences across countries in values, 
beliefs, and work roles” (Pinillos and Reyes, 2009 pg. 24). Hofstede’s (1980) international study 
surveyed 117,000 IBM employees across 70 countries at two points in time between 1968 and 
1972. Hofstede’s (1980) goal was to examine invisible cultural differences so that IBM could 
                                                           
2 This dissertation takes a country’s social values and norms as given in 1998. Thus, any institutional factors that 
may directly affect preferences through their direct influences on situational construal and rewards or indirectly 
influence the process of cultural transmission itself (Bowles, 1998) are outside of the scope of this paper. 
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improve their practices worldwide. Based on the results, Hofstede (1980) initially developed 
four, later adding a fifth, measures of cultural values. They are power distance, individual-
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity, and long term orientation. The 
cultural values for which I will focus are the measures: Power distance, individual-collectivism 
and uncertainty avoidance because they are the subjective measures most widely used to explain 
national rates of entrepreneurship (e.g., Davidsson & Wiklund, 1997). In addition, I add other 
socio-cultural theory and research specific to entrepreneurship (e.g., McGrath et al., 1992).  
 This dissertation theorizes and tests socio-cultural values of a country as an umbrella 
paradigm; each of the parts contributing to the overall socially-constructed meaning systems 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967; Malinowski 1961) that influence the inclination of individuals to 
engage in entrepreneurial activities.  As specified by Williams and McGuire (2010) “intuitively, 
culture is a construct composed of factors that are interdependent and should be considered 
together” (pg. 398). Likewise, this dissertation hypothesizes the relationship between the 
umbrella socio-cultural construct and productive (or unproductive) entrepreneurship rather than 
between each socio-cultural variable independently and productive (or unproductive) 
entrepreneurship.    
Tolerance for Ambiguity  
 Tolerance for Ambiguity is the extent to which the members of a culture do not feel 
threatened by unknown situations (Hofstede, 2001). People view ambiguity from different 
perspectives. Some societies are more accepting of the unpredictable future and welcome 
change. Other societies feel stress about the unknown and are more reluctant and cautions of 
change, preferring things to remain the same. Hofstede (2001) categorize countries into a 
continuum from low uncertainty avoidance to high uncertainty avoidance societies. 
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 Hofstede’s (2001) measure of tolerance for ambiguity is derived from Cyert and March 
(1963) which states:  
“[Organizations] avoid the requirement that they correctly anticipate events in the distant 
future by using decision rules emphasizing short-run reactions to short run feedback 
rather than anticipation of long-run uncertain events. Second…they arrange a negotiated 
environment. They impose plans, standard operating procedures…., and uncertainty-
absorbing contracts” (pg. 119).  
 
Hofstede (2001) proposes that in the same way organizations cope with ambiguity using 
rules and rituals, human societies at large use law and religion as coping mechanisms. Different 
citizens adapt to ambiguity in different ways in both traditional and modern societies (Hofstede, 
2001). The ways of coping belong to the cultural heritage of societies and are reinforced by 
institutions.  
 Entrepreneurship requires a tolerance for ambiguity because entrepreneurs work to 
develop novel products or processes (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997) and must make decisions 
when they have enough information to anticipate outcomes but not enough information to know 
the probability of success or failure of those outcomes (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Entrepreneurs 
score significantly higher than managers in their tolerance for ambiguity (Begley and Boyd, 
1987; Brockhaus, 1982; Schere, 1982). One reason that entrepreneurs are more tolerant of 
ambiguity is because entrepreneurs, on average, are more optimistic than managers in making 
decisions in situations where information is limited or there is a high degree of outcome 
uncertainty (Busenitz and Barney, 1997).  
  The national culture in which the individual resides significantly influences her 
perception of the unknown and her mechanisms for coping with the resulting ambiguity (Kwok 
and Tadesse, 2006). Some countries teach their members that they must learn to live in an 
ambiguous world (McGrath et al., 1992) while others try and avoid it all together. Cultures that 
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reinforce control over the future are less likely to prepare individuals to engage in entrepreneurial 
behavior (Hayton, 2002; Herbig and Miller, 1992). Conversely, countries that are more accepting 
of ambiguity will have individuals that are more willing to enter into unknown ventures 
(Hofstede 2001). Additionally, research has shown that countries that are more accepting of 
ambiguity are more favorably disposed toward new ideas, such as those produced by an 
entrepreneur (Phillips & Wright, 1977; Yates et al., 1989). 
 Countries with a higher tolerance for ambiguity are accepting of non-traditional behavior; 
consequently entrepreneurs in these settings have more legitimacy and stronger social incentives 
to act on endeavors than their counterparts, where entrepreneurial behavior is viewed as 
challenging tradition (Shane, 1993). The combination of these effects means that countries with a 
greater tolerance of ambiguity will have a larger pool of potential entrepreneurs and be more 
welcoming to their entrepreneurial efforts. 
Egalitarian Value Systems 
 The extent to which the less powerful expect and accept power is distributed unequally 
varies across countries (Hofstede, 2001). Different societies put different weights on status 
consistency among three areas of inequality: prestige, wealth, and power. Some societies 
elaborate formal systems of dominance while others go great lengths to de-emphasize 
dominance. Hofstede (2001) categorizes countries into a continuum from low power distance to 
high power distance societies. 
 Both low and high power distance societies have hierarchies but low power distance 
societies view them as arrangements out of convenience and are not afraid to express 
disagreement with superiors. In low power distance societies, the central tendencies of 
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individuals are to view both subordinates and superiors as ‘like me’, everyone should have equal 
rights, especially in terms of ideas, and there is a general stress on reward and legitimacy. 
 On the contrary, high power distant societies view those in power as ‘superior to me’ 
where subordinates do as they are told and do not question or challenge manager’s decisions. 
High power distance societies view superiors and subordinates as being ‘of a different kind’, 
power holders are entitled to privileges, and there is a general stress on coercive and referent 
power (Hofstede, 1980). Accordingly, the ways of viewing power distance belong to the custom 
of societies and are reinforced by the behaviors of superiors and subordinates. Some societies 
allow for the free flow information and communication across power statuses while others have 
clear hierarchical set boundaries.   
 Entrepreneurship requires the free flow of communication across organizational 
hierarchies (Aiken and Hage 1971; Evan and Black 1967; Kanter 1982; Thompson 1967). 
Entrepreneurs are much more accepting that equality is everyone’s right than their manager 
counterparts (McGrath et al., 1992; p. 126). This connection between a greater exchange of 
information across functional tiered boundaries and entrepreneurship has been verified across 
many countries (e.g., Kanter 1982; Nonaka and Yamanouchi 1989). For example, Knight (1987) 
found that innovating companies believe that anyone can become an innovation champion; 
“Even the janitor should be able to champion an idea all the way through to its development” 
(Shane, 1993 pg. 62). Hence, entrepreneurship is most prevalent in contexts where the perception 
of hierarchy is more consultative – where a person of any rank can cultivate an idea all the way 
through its progress – and where people feel freedom and control over this process.  
 The institutional environment in which an entrepreneur is embedded significantly 
influences his egalitarian value system. Societies with less egalitarian values perceive authority 
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as autocratic where superiors are viewed as existential (superior) people and forces outside the 
control of the subordinate determine outcomes (Rotter, 1966). In contrast societies with more 
egalitarian value systems exhibit liberties to challenge ideas and decisions (Hull and Hage, 1982; 
Shane, 1993; Thompson, 1967; Weber, 1958; Whyte et al., 1969) and consequently will have a 
larger proportion of individuals who believe in their own abilities and will seek disproportionate 
rewards when those abilities turn into entrepreneurial effort (Mueller and Thomas, 2001). These 
liberties encourage entrepreneurial behavior because entrepreneurship by definition requires 
challenging the status quo via discovery of new opportunities (Kirzner, 1973) or exploitation of 
carrying out new combinations (Schumpeter, 1934). 
 Furthermore, egalitarian value system societies have a narrow ‘zone of indifference’ 
between hierarchies. The ‘zone of indifference’ between subordinates and their superiors is 
widest in places where the subordinate will accept orders without questioning authority (Barnard, 
1938) and superiors do not seek to convince subordinates but only seek to obtain their 
compliance (Mahoney, 2005). Narrower zones of indifference provide a supportive environment 
for entrepreneurs (e.g. Shane, 1993) because it provides a welcoming environment for 
subordinates to question processes or ideas and as a result encourages individual initiative at all 
levels (Pinillos and Reyes, 2009).  Consequently, countries with egalitarian value systems will 
have more entrepreneurs and be appreciative of their efforts. 
Acceptance of Individuality  
 Individualism is defined as societies in which “ties between individuals are loose: 
Everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family only” (Hofstede, 
2001 pg. 225). Collectivistic societies are those with strong, cohesive in-groups and an 
unquestionably lifetime loyalty and trust to the group or society as a whole. Hofstede (2001) 
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categorizes countries into a spectrum from low individualist (collectivistic) to high 
individualistic societies. 
 Low individualistic societies have central tendencies of ‘we’ orientations, emphasis on 
belonging to the group and emotional dependence on institutions and organizations. High 
individualistic societies have “I” orientations, emphasis on individual initiates and achievement 
(leadership is ideal), and are emotionally independent from institutions or organizations. Because 
the relationship between degree of individualism or collectivism in a society is linked to societal 
norms, we observe these behaviors to effect individuals’ day-to-day behavior at home and work.  
 Entrepreneurship requires independence, self-reliance, resourcefulness and self-
confidence (Hornaday and Aboud 1971; McClelland 1987; Shane, 1993; Solomon and Winslow 
1988; Timmons 1978). The entrepreneur is a motivated individual who relies primarily on self 
rather than others to formulate and implement his goals and accepts his own failure (Hisrich, 
1990; McClelland, 1961; Mueller & Thomas, 2001). Entrepreneurs are commonly characterized 
as demonstrating a greater internal locus of control, believing their own ability, instead of 
external forces, such as luck or destiny (Brockhaus, 1982; Perry, 1990; Rotter, 1966; Shapero, 
1975; Winslow and Solomon, 1989).  
 Extent research has shown a strong link between the acceptance of individuality in a 
country and entrepreneurial behavior (Hayton et al., 2002; Hunt & Levie, 2002; McGrath et al., 
1992; Mitchell et al., 2000; Mueller & Thomas, 2001; Pinillos & Reyes, 2009; Shane 1992, 
1993; Wennekers et al., 2007). There are two underlying reasons for these findings. First, 
individualistic societies are less likely to need support from others or conformity to norms 
(Sexton & Bowman, 1985) because they are motivated by self-interests and the achievement of 
personal objectives (Pinillos & Reyes, 2009). Accordingly, societies with a larger proportion of 
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individuals who do not need social support of the group and are motivated by self-concept are 
more likely to become entrepreneurs. Second, entrepreneurs in individualistic countries will find 
their surroundings to be encouraging for entrepreneurial behavior because the general public will 
behave with autonomy, variety, and financial security over order (McGrath et al., 1992). On the 
other hand, societies where economic activity is primarily collective, exhibit a less conducive 
environment for entrepreneurship because venturing tasks are likely distributed among many 
participants (Mitchell et al., 2000). 
 The positive relationship between individualism and entrepreneurship suggest that 
countries which value individuality will be more entrepreneurial (Earley and Gibson, 1998; Hunt 
and Levie, 2002; McGrath et al., 1992; Oyserman et al., 2002; Shane, 1993; Triandis, 1995). 
Research has shown that high individualist cultures are more accepting of individual 
achievement and have greater levels of new firm creation (McGrath et al. 1992; Mueller and 
Thomas 2001; Shane 1992, 1993; Wennekers et al. 2002). The combination of these effects 
means that countries with a greater acceptance of individuality will have a larger supply of 
potential entrepreneurs and be more receiving to their entrepreneurial efforts. 
Portrayal of Entrepreneurship by Media 
  In addition to the three categories of tolerance for ambiguity, egalitarian value systems 
and acceptance of individuality, I identify a fourth category: portrayal of entrepreneurship by 
media as a determinant of the amount of entrepreneurs in a society. I draw from the mass 
communications literature to predict how the portrayal of entrepreneurship by media relates to 
overall levels of entrepreneurship in a country.  
 The entrepreneurship literature has largely disregarded the relationship between portrayal 
of entrepreneurship via media and entrepreneurial activity. This inattention is particularly 
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surprising because there is existing literature on the relationship between mass media 
communications and societal norms (e.g., McDonald, 2004) as well as literature on the 
connection between societal norms and entrepreneurship (e.g., Tiessen, 1997). One exception is 
the Hindle and Klyver study (2007) which found a positive association between volume of 
entrepreneurship media stories and people running young businesses (greater than 3 months but 
less than 24 months old). Their findings are well-matched with the ‘reinforcement model’ in the 
mass communications literature. The reinforcement model conjectures that media reinforces 
opinions, ideas and values of audience members. Following their framework, I hypothesize the 
positive portrayal of entrepreneurship by media will reinforce societal values pertaining to 
entrepreneurship, therefore directly and indirectly affecting national levels of entrepreneurship.  
 In Klapper’s (1960) reinforcement model media messages are capable of reinforcing 
ideas, values and attitudes which persons already possess as a result of other socializing 
agencies. Consequently, we can assume greater volume of positive media coverage of productive 
entrepreneurship is a reflection of a society that overall values entrepreneurial behavior. 
Accordingly, countries that have greater volume of positive media coverage should have a 
greater amount of entrepreneurs. The volume of positive media coverage will reinforce 
entrepreneurial behavior by highlighting the success of entrepreneurs (Hindle and Klyver, 2007), 
which will directly strengthens the ideology that success is achievable to individuals who are 
able to apply their unique vision and expertise to a new opportunity. Furthermore, entrepreneurs 
in countries that have greater amounts of positive media coverage of entrepreneurs indirectly 
create an environment, which is more conducive to new venture creation by encouraging public 
acceptance of entrepreneurship.  
15 
 
 The representation of productive entrepreneurship by media is different in each country. 
Some countries celebrate entrepreneurship, frequently featuring stories on successful new 
ventures while other countries rarely showcase the success of entrepreneurs (Reynolds et al., 
2004). Societies with greater amount of media coverage on productive entrepreneurship reinforce 
the behaviors and attitudes of citizens who have a predisposed toward entrepreneurship (Klapper, 
1960) and will result in a larger pool of potential entrepreneurs.   
Socio-cultural values drive both productive and unproductive entrepreneurship 
 The socio-cultural literature holds that the variation in entrepreneurship results from 
differences in societal norms and has implicitly assumed that this entrepreneurship is productive. 
However, as Baumol (1990) proposes the exercise of entrepreneurship is not always productive 
(rent-creating) and can sometimes be unproductive (rent-shifting). Hence, if entrepreneurship is 
considered “the imaginative pursuit of position, with limited concern about the means used to 
achieve the purpose…” (Baumol, 1990; pg. 909) then the same socio-cultural values which lead 
to productive entrepreneurship can also lead to unproductive entrepreneurship.  Accordingly, the 
logic used for the four identified pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values – tolerance for 
ambiguity, egalitarian value system, acceptance of individual, and portrayal of entrepreneurship 
by media – should not only increase levels of productive entrepreneurship but also increase 
levels of unproductive entrepreneurship.  
 Unproductive entrepreneurship requires a tolerance for ambiguity because unproductive 
entrepreneurs are working in ambiguous situations where the penalties for their actions may be 
even higher than the risk of losing money (i.e. jail time).  Unproductive entrepreneurs make 
decisions and take actions with limited information on the probability of being exposed for 
running their unregistered businesses. Countries that are more accepting of ambiguity will have 
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more individuals willing to enter into unknown ventures. To such a degree, people in societies 
that are more comfortable with ambiguity may view the risk of unproductive entrepreneurship as 
acceptable when the perceived opportunities are high.    
 Entrepreneurs will perceive unproductive entrepreneurship as acceptable when it offers 
the biggest opportunity for capturing rents (Murphy, et al., 1991). Unproductive entrepreneurs in 
egalitarian value system societies will have confidence in their distinct capabilities to act and 
perceive themselves as ‘like productive entrepreneurs’ in their innovative endeavors. 
Entrepreneurs in egalitarian value system societies are more likely to hold the belief that anyone 
regardless of their type of activity should be rewarded for their efforts and consequently will 
seek disproportionate rewards for identifying opportunities even if those discoveries are in the 
form of unregistered businesses. To this logic, entrepreneurs in countries categorized as having 
egalitarian value systems may view the risk of unproductive activities as the better chance for 
success when the prospect for rent capturing is high.       
 Unproductive entrepreneurship requires independence, self-reliance and resourcefulness.  
The unproductive entrepreneur is a self-motivated individual who believes he has the 
distinguishable competency to be an entrepreneur in whichever type of entrepreneurship offers 
him the most opportunities.  Unproductive entrepreneurs do not need social support of the group 
particularly from those running registered firms to engage in unproductive activities.  
Entrepreneurs residing in societies that are more accepting of individuality, value autonomy and 
variety, may engage in unproductive activities over productive if the perceived results are 
greater. 
 Additionally, the amount of positive media coverage on productive entrepreneurship 
heightens the awareness that individuals who act on entrepreneurial opportunities are rewarded 
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for their actions. The limited literature on the relationship between media and entrepreneurship 
has focused on productive entrepreneurship alone. Yet, the same logic used to associate the 
reinforcement of productive entrepreneurship by means of media coverage may be applied to 
unproductive entrepreneurship as well. Positive media messages that reinforced entrepreneurial 
ambition may not equate to productive outcomes.  If media message are reinforcing the 
entrepreneurial drive and entrepreneurs find the easiest way to apply their unique entrepreneurial 
vision and expertise are in the form of unproductive allocations then the entrepreneur may 
engage in unproductive entrepreneurship over productive entrepreneurship.   
   As previously specified, this dissertation theorizes socio-cultural values of a country as 
an umbrella paradigm. Thus, socio-cultural value systems are pro-entrepreneurial when there are 
higher tolerances for ambiguity, more egalitarian value systems, stronger acceptance of 
individuality and greater levels of media coverage of entrepreneurship. This logic leads to the 
following hypotheses:  
(H1a) the greater level of pro-entrepreneurial values in a country the greater the level of 
productive entrepreneurship 
(H1b) the greater level of pro-entrepreneurial values in a country the greater the level of 
unproductive entrepreneurship 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ALLOCATION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY – THEORY 
AND HYPOTHESES   
 
In different countries and time periods, talented people chose entrepreneurship as an 
occupation when it provides the greatest rewards for being a superstar (Murphy et al., 1991). 
Entrepreneurs are defined as persons who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to 
their own wealth, power, and prestige and may  or may not be overly concerned with whether or 
not their activities are productive to society as a whole (Baumol, 1990). Consequently, in order 
to understand the contribution of entrepreneurship to economic wealth we must first recognize 
the full range of entrepreneurial activities and the role of institutions (Sobel, 2008). 
 Baumol (1990) and others (e.g., Murphy, 1991) propose that the ‘rules of the game’ 
(North, 1990) determine the relative payoffs to different entrepreneurial activities and 
accordingly entrepreneurial behavior will be directed toward productive or unproductive in a 
manner that corresponds to the variations in the rules of the game. Entrepreneurs will allocate 
their efforts toward productive activities when the incentive system makes being a productive 
entrepreneur more beneficial than unproductive. As a result, the allocation of entrepreneurial 
effort is strongly effected by policy (e.g., Glaser et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1997). The 
institutional context in which entrepreneurs are embedded has a substantial impact on the 
contribution that entrepreneurs make to economic growth (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008). 
The Allocation of Entrepreneurship  
The entrepreneurship literature overall views entrepreneurial activity as economically 
beneficial because entrepreneurs are the actors who create organizations that yield new jobs, 
increase trade, and generate or accelerate innovative ideas (Arzeni, 1998; Bates & Dunham, 
1993; McDougall & Oviatt, 1997), which in turn leads to economic growth. But, not all 
entrepreneurship is productive – entrepreneurs can channel their energies toward unproductive 
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activities ranging from unofficial firms to criminal enterprise. Because the exercise of 
entrepreneurship can sometimes be unproductive or even destructive it is necessary to define the 
distinction between productive and unproductive entrepreneurial activities.  
 In previous literature, the distinction among productive, unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship is the difference between rent-creating, rent-shifting and rent-destroying, 
respectively (Desai & Acs, 2007). Productive entrepreneurship is rent-creating because it creates 
rents for both the entrepreneur and the economy (e.g., new innovation, new firm). Unproductive 
entrepreneurship is rent-shifting because it benefits only the entrepreneur without benefiting 
society (e.g., counterfeiting, unofficial firms). Destructive entrepreneurship is rent-destroying 
because it is detrimental to society and decreases economic activity (e.g., criminal activity). In 
this section, I define and describe these three types of entrepreneurship.   
Productive Entrepreneurship 
 Entrepreneurship is commonly viewed as a significant stimulus of positive outcomes at 
both the firm level and the society level (Ireland and Webb, 2007) because it creates jobs, 
advances technology, and revives consumer welfare (Birley, 1986; Zahra, 2005, Gudeman, 1992; 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The entrepreneur’s role in the economy has been studied for many 
centuries with significant contributions from Cantillon, Say, Mill, Knight, Schumpeter and 
Kirzner (Sobel, 2008). Each of these scholars, among others, advanced our understanding of the 
positive and productive relationship between the entrepreneur and the economy.  
 Cantillon was among the first economic writers to regard an economy in terms of classes 
of individuals (landlords, laborers, and entrepreneurs); each defined by a major economic 
function (Hébert, 1985). Entrepreneurs differed from landlords and laborers because they lived 
with uncertainty (Hébert, 1985 citing Cantillon, 1931). Kirzner (1973) narrowed Cantillon’s 
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assessment by viewing the function of the entrepreneur as a person with alertness to profit 
opportunities. In such a way, entrepreneurs differed from other individuals because of their 
alertness of unnoticed opportunities unrelated to a need for capital or resources.  
 Jean Baptiste Say described the function of the entrepreneur as the individual who shifts 
economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and greater 
yield (Say, 1880 [translated by Prinsep & Biddle, 1971]). Mill (1848) saw the function of the 
entrepreneur to be the person who was exposed to the most risk. Knight (1921) argued instead 
that entrepreneurs were not exposed to risk, something that you could predict the probability of 
triumph, but instead acting under true uncertainty, a situation where it is impossible to estimate 
or predict the probably of success. In Knight’s (1921) view, entrepreneurs are rewarded higher 
distributions of payments in society for their sound judgment on entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 In lines with Knight (1921), Schumpeter countered that entrepreneurs are combiners who 
do not necessarily bear all the risk (Carland et al, 1988). Schumpeter (1934) built on Say’s 
(1880) interpretation of the entrepreneur by describing the function of the entrepreneurs to 
“reform or revolutionize the pattern of production” The entrepreneur creates greater return than 
others “by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for 
producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source 
of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on” (pg. p. 
132). To Say (1880) and Schumpeter (1924), the entrepreneur is the change agent that moves the 
economy forward.  
 The field of entrepreneurship is rooted in the acceptance that entrepreneurial activity 
promotes economic growth and development (Minniti, 2008). We observe this perception from 
the earliest research of entrepreneurship (e.g., Cantillon, 1931) to the more recent work (e.g., 
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Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). Traditionally, scholars viewed the function of the entrepreneur as 
positive for the economy because when entrepreneur endure uncertainty and are alert to 
opportunities they are able to shift low profits to greater returns and reformed or revolutionized 
the pattern of production. More recently scholars have viewed the function of the entrepreneur as 
the society’s hypothesis testers who try out alternative combinations so others can learn from 
their successes and failures (McGrath, 1999), and as ‘knowledge filters’ transforming inventions 
into commercially viable products and process (Acs et al., 2004). 
Unproductive Entrepreneurship 
 The assumption that entrepreneurial activity is always economically beneficial is 
challenged by the theory of the allocation of entrepreneurship. Baumol (1990) wrote: 
  “Entrepreneurs are always with us and always play some substantial role. But there are a 
 variety of roles among which the entrepreneur’s efforts can be reallocated, and some of 
 those roles do not follow the constructive and innovative script that is conventionally 
 attributed to that person. Indeed, at times, the entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical 
 existence that is actually damaging to the economy” (Baumol, 1990: pg. 894). 
 
 Baumol’s (1990) theory of the allocation of entrepreneurship is based off of Schumpeter 
(1934). Schumpeter (1934) defines entrepreneurship as the carrying out of new combinations 
which takes the various forms of: introduction of a new good, introduction of a new method of 
production, opening of a new market, conquest of a new source of supply of materials or goods 
and the carrying out of a new organization (pg. 66). Baumol refines Schumpeter model by 
proposing that entrepreneurial effort can be allocated among productive, unproductive or 
destructive forms. 
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 In the 1990s, other scholars studied the allocation of entrepreneurially resources. For 
example, Murphy et al. (1991) put forward that entrepreneurs have a choice of either starting a 
new firm (productive entrepreneurship) or becoming rent shifters (unproductive 
entrepreneurship). As a consequence, the growth of a country is dependent on getting the ablest 
people to the productive sector of the economy. Murphy and colleagues (1991) polished Lucas’ 
(1978) view that when high ability people start a new firm they improve current productive 
techniques, which will be imitated and subsequently all productivity rises.  
 In terms of entrepreneurship, rent-shifting behavior is commonly understood as “any 
redistributive activity that takes up resources” (Murphy et al., 1993 pg. 409) ranging from black 
market exchanges to criminal enterprise (Baumol, 1990, 1996). I categorize this rent-seeking 
behavior into the activities of the informal economy (Ahumada et al., 2007) and define the 
informal economy as economic activities that avoid regulation or observation (Del’ Anno, 2003; 
Feige, 1989). These activities may include not registering a firm after inception, not reporting 
income from self-employment or other unreported work, employment discounts or fringe 
benefits as well as the trade of stolen goods, drug dealings, prostitutions, gambling, smuggling 
and fraud (Lippert and Walker, 1997; Schneider, 2002).   
 Unproductive entrepreneurship refers to rent-shifting behaviors that do not benefit society 
as a whole but instead benefit exclusively the individual entrepreneurs. For example, a steel 
entrepreneur might react to competition by “trying either to find a better way of producing steel 
(productive entrepreneurship), or by lobbying for subsidies, tariff protection, or filing legal anti-
trust actions (unproductive entrepreneurship)” (Sobel, 2008 pg. 642). When talented people 
become rent shifters most of their private returns come from redistribution of wealth from others 
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and not from wealth creation. As a result, talented people do not improve technological 
opportunities and the economy stagnates (Murphy et al., 1991).  
 The literature which includes destructive entrepreneurship implies it to be “more bad” 
than unproductive entrepreneurship, but makes no specific comment on the nature or effect of 
such activity (Desai & Acs, 2007). I view destructive entrepreneurship as a part of the 
unproductive category because a distinction among bad and ‘more bad’ is not necessary – 
entrepreneurship is either productive, benefiting society, or it is not. This dissertation will focus 
on the unproductive allocation of entrepreneurial activity which is “not positive” and therefore 
destructive entrepreneurship will be labeled under the broad umbrella category of unproductive 
entrepreneurship. 
 This suggestion of grouping destructive under the umbrella of unproductive is not 
intended to discount any work on destructive entrepreneurship. The literature on destructive 
entrepreneurship is in the early stage of theory development and has not been elaborated in 
definition or theory. The distinction between destructive entrepreneurship and unproductive 
entrepreneurship proposed by Desai and Acs’ (2007) is that destructive entrepreneurship has a 
negative effect on GDP (individual captures economic rights and reduces joint monetary surplus) 
as opposed to unproductive entrepreneurship which has a neutral effect on GDP. Furthermore, 
destructive entrepreneurship is rent-destroying because it stifles innovation and creates 
inefficiencies in the economy such as corruption.  
Review of Empirical Tests: Allocation of Entrepreneurship  
 As stated in the contribution section, few papers have empirically tested Baumol’s theory 
(1990). In this next section, I review the papers that have empirically tested the allocation of 
entrepreneurship theory and their contributions, limitations and potential for future work. 
24 
 
Baumol’s (1990) pivotal piece “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and 
Destructive,” in the Journal of Political Economy has been cited over 500 times (Web of 
Science) but only three papers, to my knowledge, have empirically tested his propositions. Sobel 
(2008) puts forward that the lack of empirical papers is due to the fact that all three variables – 
productive, unproductive, and destructive - are unobservable. Because of the difficulty in 
distinguishing among the various allocations, many researchers sidestep the distinction by 
focusing on start-ups only (e.g., Bjornskov and Foss, 2008) and test the influence of a country’s 
institutional environment on productive entrepreneurship only (e.g., Aidis et al., 2008). The few 
papers (Capelleras, et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 1991; Sobel, 2008) that test allocation of 
entrepreneurship literature each have their own contributions and limitations.  
 Murphy and colleagues (1991), Capelleras and others (2008) and Sobel (2008) 
investigate the allocation of entrepreneurship literature in three diverse ways. These papers ask 
three different research questions. Murphy (et al., 1991) asks what determines the attractiveness 
of an occupation to talent. Capelleras (et al, 2008) questions if the allocation of entrepreneurship 
changes per the rules of the game or if the quantity of entrepreneurship corresponds with the 
types of regulation. Sobel (2008) investigates the relationship between quality of state political 
and legal institutions and productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. All three of these 
papers find support for the theory, the differences among them is the research question asked and 
the level of sophistication of the empirical measures utilized.  
 In these acknowledged empirical papers (Capelleras, et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 1991; 
Sobel, 2008) productive entrepreneurship is measured as the percentage of college students 
majoring in engineering (Murphy et al., 1991), total number of registered firms (Capelleras et al., 
2008) and the multi-dimensional measure including venture capital investments per capita, 
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patents per capita, growth rate of self-employment activity, and establishment of new firms 
(Sobel, 2008). Unproductive entrepreneurship is measured as the percentage of college students 
majoring in law (Murphy et al., 1991), total number of non-registered firms determined by a 
survey asking owners if they were registered for value-added tax (Capelleras, et al., 2008), and 
the more multifaceted measures of total number of political and lobbying organizations (Sobel, 
2008). Destructive entrepreneurship was not measured in any of these three studies.  
 Measures used to capture the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990) which determine the 
allocation of entrepreneurial effort toward productive or unproductive were the costs in terms of 
time and money to establish a new business (Capelleras et al., 2008) and an institutional quality 
index (Karabegovic and McMahon,  2005) which includes the extent to which states have secure 
private property rights, a fair and balanced judicial system, contract enforcement, small 
government sectors and effective limits on government’s ability to transfer wealth through 
taxation and regulation (Sobel, 2008). Murphy (et al., 1991) did not test the institutional context 
but instead compared the allocation of talent toward entrepreneurship (college students majoring 
in engineering) as opposed to rent-shifting (college students majoring in law) to GDP growth. 
  The third measure, the allocation of entrepreneurship, is based off of the assumption that 
the distribution of productive to unproductive will fluctuate, depending on rules and regulations, 
instead of the quantity of entrepreneurs changing. The ratio between productive and 
unproductive entrepreneurship is measured by a comparison of total number of college student 
majoring in engineering set against those majoring in law to the GDP per capita of a country 
(Murphy et al, 1991) and a self-calculated net entrepreneurial productivity (NEP) score which 
normalized both variables (productive and unproductive) to compute a single index number so 
that a comparison between productive and unproductive activities is attainable (Sobel, 2008). 
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Since Capelleras (et al., 2008) tests the assumption of the theory, he and his colleagues do not 
compute the difference between productive and unproductive but instead compare countries with 
high regulation to low regulation. They find that firms starting in high-regulated countries are 
larger at start-up and subsequently grow more slowly but when all firms (non-registered too) are 
included, these differences disappear. Accordingly both initial size and subsequent growth are 
remarkably similar in high and low regulated countries. These three empirical pieces show 
support for the assumption and the prediction of the theory - the rules and regulations of a 
country have a great impact on the levels of productive relative to unproductive 
entrepreneurship.  
 While these papers (Capelleras, et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 1991; Sobel, 2008) provide a 
good starting point for empirically testing the propositions of the of allocation of 
entrepreneurship literature, each of them can be improved upon. First and most critical is the 
operationalization of these concepts. Many of the measures used to test the theory of the 
allocation of entrepreneurship are problematic. For example, Murphy (et al., 1991) uses the 
number of college students majoring in law as a proxy for the extent of rent shifting behavior and 
acknowledges that “although lawyers do different things in different countries, and 
undergraduate enrollments might not be a good proxy for the extent of each activity; these are 
the best measures of rent shifting and entrepreneurship we could find” (pg. 523). However, 
lawyers can be viewed as the transaction cost engineers whose function is to act as 
intermediaries designing transaction cost efficient structures through which to carry out 
productive activities (Gilson, 1997). Sobel (2008) measure rent shifting entrepreneurship - 
number of political and lobbying organizations but compares different states in the United States 
only. 
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 Furthermore, there are other empirical works which claims to test the theory but only 
truly examine part of it. For instance, Bowen and Clercq (2008) report statistical support for 
Baumol’s thesis that “a country’s institutional characteristics influence the allocation of 
entrepreneurial endeavors” (page 759). Yet, the authors test only productive entrepreneurship 
defined as number of start-ups that expect to hire at least 20 people within the first 5 years of 
business. One of the main reasons for so few empirical pieces, and partial studies of the theory, is 
the lack of clarity in the conceptualization and operationalization of productive entrepreneurship, 
unproductive entrepreneurship and the rules and regulation variables.  
 In Chapter 1, I hypothesized the direct relationship between societal values and 
preferences with the rates of entrepreneurship, productive and unproductive within each country. 
In Chapter 2, I incorporate the rules and regulation literature to hypothesize how the ‘rules of the 
game’ (North, 1990) provide the incentives that shift the allocation of entrepreneurially effort 
toward either productive or unproductive entrepreneurship. 
 All countries have policies that restrict entrepreneurship so formalizing the estimations 
and testing their significance is important for policy and research. 
 Krueger (1974, pg. 302-303) writes:  
 “One can conceive of a continuum between a system of no restriction and a perfectly 
 restricted system. With no restriction, entrepreneurs would seek to achieve windfall gains 
 by adopting new technologies, anticipating market shifts correctly and so on. With 
 perfect restrictions, regulations would be so all-pervasive that rent seeking would be the 
 only route to gain. In such a system, entrepreneurs would devote all of their time and 
 resources to capturing windfall rents. While neither of these extreme types could ever 
 exit, one can perhaps ask where there might be some point along the continuum which 
 the market fails to perform its allocated function to any satisfactory degree. It will remain 
 for further work to formalize these conjectures and to test their significance”  
   
The optimal level of institutional framework for a productive entrepreneur is when a 
country provides the maximum ability for the entrepreneur to capture rents from his efforts at the 
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minimal possible cost. Along these lines, in this next set of hypothesis, I work under the 
prediction that the closer to optimal each of the five identified rules and regulations in a country 
the greater the impact of the socio-cultural measure on the level of productive entrepreneurship 
relative unproductive entrepreneurship. 
 By integrating these literatures, I am able to predict the allocation of entrepreneurial 
effort while taking into account the amount of entrepreneurs (the quantity for each country). 
Separately each of these literatures provides only partial explanations for why levels of 
entrepreneurship vary across countries. Taken together we are better able to predict and explain 
the variation of the amount and allocation of entrepreneurship.   
Hypotheses: The Allocation of Entrepreneurship - Rules and Regulations  
Having reasoned that the same pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values drive both 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, I now draw from the rules and regulations 
literature for the logic that entrepreneurship can be allocated among different activities (e.g. 
Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). I argue that in deciding whether to pursue entrepreneurship, an 
entrepreneur will consider the costs he must incur to pursue productive entrepreneurship and the 
opportunity to capture rents from his efforts. I put forward that as the rules and regulations under 
examination in this study improve the stronger the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values and productive entrepreneurship and the weaker the relationship between 
those same values and unproductive entrepreneurship. In this dissertation improved rules and 
regulations are environments in which the productive entrepreneur can retain the most benefits 
from his efforts with the lowest costs.   
  Baumol (1990) and others (e.g., Murphy, 1991) propose that the ‘rules of the game’ 
(North, 1990) determine the relative payoffs to different entrepreneurial activities and 
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accordingly entrepreneurial behavior will be directed toward productive or unproductive 
activities in a manner that corresponds to the variations in the ‘rules of the game’. Entrepreneurs 
will allocate their efforts toward productive activities when the incentive system makes being a 
productive entrepreneur more beneficial than unproductive. As a result, the allocation of 
entrepreneurial effort is strongly effected by policy (e.g., Glaser et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 
1997). It is the institutional context in which entrepreneurs are embedded that has a substantial 
impact on the contribution that entrepreneurs make to economic growth (Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008). 
 The logic used for this section is improvements in rules and regulations in a country are 
defined as those rules which increase the level of productive entrepreneurship relative to 
unproductive entrepreneurship. An improvement in rules and regulations in a country will lead to 
a stronger relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and productive 
entrepreneurship and a weaker relationship between those same values and unproductive 
entrepreneurship. I build on Baumol’s (1990) broad reference to “rules and regulations” and 
identify five specific sets of institutional factors that steer the allocation of entrepreneurial 
resources toward productive or unproductive activities.  
Administrative Barriers to Entry 
 Starting a new business requires the permission of a variety of government bodies 
(Hawkins, 1993) and such approvals come in the form of time-consuming government 
procedures (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007). Existing research has shown a strong link between 
the amount of administrative barriers to entry required to start a new firm in a country and levels 
of productive entrepreneurship (e.g., Aidis et al., 2008). Countries that encourage 
entrepreneurship by having minimal administrative barriers to entry are likely to enable 
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individuals to engage in productive behavior because the cost in doing so is minimal. On the 
other hand, countries that make engaging in productive entrepreneurship more costly will have 
individuals who view productive entrepreneurship as an expensive endeavor and may decide to 
allocate efforts in an unproductive manner to avoid the expense, in terms of time and money, to 
be a productive entrepreneur. 
 There are two prominent theories that explain the role of regulation, and in particular 
administrative barriers to entry, in economic theory. These include public interest theory (Pigou, 
1938) and public choice theory (e.g., Stigler, 1971). Pigou’s (1938) public interest theory 
predicts that stricter regulation of entry is associated with superior outcomes. The theory holds 
that if markets are unregulated they will exhibit frequent failures and accordingly it is the role of 
government to protect the public by means of regulation (Djankov et al, 2002). In terms of 
entrepreneurship, public interest theory predicts stricter regulation of new entrants to be 
beneficial to society because it requires minimum standards be met, through a greater number of 
procedures, and approval granted before new businesses can transact with the general public and 
other businesses.  
The other perspective is the public choice theory (Peltzman 1976; Tullock 1967; Stigler 
1971) which predicts that stricter regulation of entry is associated with inferior outcomes. The 
theory, with two schools of thought – theory of regulatory capture (Stingler, 1971) and tollbooth 
view (De Soto 1990; McChesney, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993.) – holds that stringent 
regulation is inefficient and unproductive to society. In terms of entrepreneurship, public choice 
theory predicts that stricter regulation of entrants is detrimental to society because it only 
benefits industry incumbents who wish to keep out new competitors (Theory of Regulatory 
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Capture) or politicians and bureaucrats who desire rents for themselves via bribes (Tollbooth 
View).  
Using the rationality of public interest theory and public choice theory plus understanding 
that government restrictions on economic activity are a universal fact of life (Krueger, 1974), 
administrative barriers of entry may be beneficial (public interest theory) and detrimental (public 
choice theory). The administrative barriers of entry are beneficial in requiring minimum 
standards for operations be met but become detrimental when the amount of administrative 
barriers increases to a level too costly for the entrepreneur.  
The amount administrative barriers to entry that an entrepreneur must bear vary between 
countries (Djankov et al, 2002). Countries with fewer procedures and administrative 
requirements for business start-ups are environments in which starting a new firm is more easily 
accomplished (Botero et al., 2004; Klapper et al., 2006). Conversely, countries with numerous 
procedures and high administrative fees required to start a new firm are environments in which 
starting a new firm is much more challenging (De Clercq et al., 2010; Puffer et al., 2010).  
 Productive entrepreneurship requires dealing with administrative barriers to entry. In 
1983, De Soto conducted a study where his research team followed all necessary bureaucratic 
procedures to set up a one-employee garment factory in Lima (De Soto, 1989). It took 289 days 
and $1,231, the equivalent of three years of wages, for the factory to be in a legal position to start 
operations (Djankov, 2009). “When legality is a privilege available only to those with political 
and economic power, those excluded—the poor—have no alternative but illegality,” writes 
Mario Vargas Llosa in the Foreword to de Soto’s (1989) book (Djankov, 2009). Accordingly, the 
allocation of entrepreneurial effort is strongly affected by the amount administrative barriers to 
entry.  
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  This relationship suggests that when the amount administrative barriers to entry to start a 
firm are high individuals will view this as a major constraint for being a productive entrepreneur 
and the more likely he will choose to allocate his resources toward unproductive 
entrepreneurship over productive entrepreneurship. This logic leads to the following hypotheses: 
 (H2a) The less administrative barriers to entry required to start a business in a country, 
the stronger the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and 
productive entrepreneurship 
 (H2b) The less administrative barriers to entry required to start a business in a country, 
the weaker the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and 
unproductive entrepreneurship 
Property Rights and Enforcement of Contracts 
 Productive entrepreneurship requires secure property rights and the enforcement of 
contracts. Without secure property rights, individuals are required to allocate effort away from 
productive activities in the effort to secure legally unprotected property (DeSoto, 1989). The 
more costly it is, in terms of protecting property rights and enforcement of contracts for an 
entrepreneur to engage in productive entrepreneurship, the more likely he will choose to allocate 
his resources toward unproductive entrepreneurship over productive entrepreneurship.  
 Property rights refer to “the degree to which government creates the right to private 
property and enforces the laws written to protect those rights” (McMullen et al., 2008 pg. 883). 
Ownership of a firm provides residual rights of control over the firm's assets including the right 
to decide how assets are used to the extent that a particular usage has not been specified in the 
initial contract (Hart and Moore, 1990). Consequently, the extent to which property rights are 
secure and contracts enforceable determines entrepreneurs’ rights to a newly established firm and 
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rights to make exchanges in the market. When a transaction occurs in the marketplace, the value 
of the property rights determines the value of what is exchanged (Demsetz, 1967). DiLorenzo 
(2004, pp. 20–21) writes, “When it comes down to it, what are being traded in a capitalist 
economy are property rights—the ownership rights in goods and services.” The protection of 
private property rights and the enforcement of contracts are of fundamental importance for 
entrepreneurship and economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 1994; North, 1981; Rodrik, 2004; 
Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986).  
 Although there is a large amount of literature on the role of property rights to individuals, 
firms and countries (De Soto, 1989; Knack and Keefer, 2006), the link specifically to 
entrepreneurship is limited. Yet, evidence exists that the inability of institutions to protect 
property rights leaves productive activities vulnerable to predation and may act as a deterrent for 
an entrepreneur. Extortion by organized crime groups takes place in almost all countries in 
varying degrees but is particularly prevalent in countries that lack property right protection. 
Hence, the secure protection of private property rights is of central importance for entrepreneurs.  
 There are observed differences in the amounts of protection of property rights across 
countries. Certain countries strongly protect private property rights and create environments 
where firms will spend a large amount of resources on defending patenting instead of creating 
new innovations. Other countries have secure private property rights which allows for voluntary 
exchanges based on contracts. On the other spectrum are countries where property rights are 
insecure and anarchy exists (e.g., Zimbabwe). Institutions that protect private property enable 
talent to be allocated toward productive entrepreneurship where it generates the highest value to 
the society (Murphy et al., 1991).  
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 In summary, the literature suggests that secure property rights enable productive 
entrepreneurs to create value in the marketplace. Conversely, insecure property rights will act as 
a limitation for the productive entrepreneur. When such limitations exist, the likelihood of an 
entrepreneur becoming unproductive will increase. This logic leads to the following hypotheses: 
(H3a) The more well-defined the property rights and enforcement of contracts, the 
stronger the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and 
productive entrepreneurship 
 (H3b) The more well-defined the property rights and enforcement of contracts, the 
weaker the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values unproductive 
entrepreneurship 
Bankruptcy Laws  
 Entrepreneurship requires understanding bankruptcy laws because “part of the new 
venture value creation efforts hinges on the ability to harvest that value at some point(s) in the 
future” (Holmberg, 1991, p. 203) and the possibility of exit by failure is one of those potential 
future outcomes. Consequently, the pro-entrepreneurial bankruptcy laws that are more forgiving 
to the new business owners are of vital significance for entrepreneurs. The more costly it is, in 
terms of dealing with a failed business, for an entrepreneur to engage in productive 
entrepreneurship, the more likely he will choose to allocate his resources toward unproductive 
entrepreneurship over productive entrepreneurship. 
 With hundreds of thousands of firms around the world declaring bankruptcy each year, 
corporate bankruptcy has become common (Lee et al, 2007) and important to policy makers 
worldwide. Bankruptcy laws are designed to balance several objectives, including protecting the 
rights of creditors and other stakeholders, and preventing the premature liquidation of viable 
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firms (Claessens and Klapper, 2005). These laws include a number of features such as who can 
file for reorganization or liquidation and the weight given to the debtor and creditors (Armour 
and Cumming, 2008). One mechanism by which governments have sought to implement 
entrepreneurial-friendly policies is through forgiving bankruptcy laws (Armour and Cumming, 
2008). Forgiving bankruptcy laws limit the personal liability of entrepreneurs and managers of 
bankrupt firms (Lee et al, 2007).  
  Entrepreneurial-friendly bankruptcy laws discharge a bankrupt person from debt when 
creditors are allowed to collect residual assets but may not pursue any remaining claims from the 
individual (White, 2001). Such laws which discharge bankrupt entrepreneurs are commonly 
called “fresh start” laws (Ayotte, 2007; White, 2001). In the absence of these laws, bankrupt 
entrepreneurs can be personally liable for a failed firm. For instance, in Germany, bankrupt 
entrepreneurs can be liable for unpaid debt for up to 30 years and may even sustain criminal 
penalties (Fialski, 1994; Ziechmann, 1997). In many Asian countries, most firms do not file for 
bankruptcy, even when they are losing money, in fear of the consequences of criminal law suit or 
personal financial harm (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2004; Carney, 2004; White, 2004).  
 Legal procedures associated with bankruptcy vary significantly across countries. Certain 
countries provide partial protection for bankrupt firms while others countries limit the extent to 
which owners are personally liable for unsuccessful ventures (Lee et al., 2007). Bankruptcy laws 
can release bankrupt individuals from debt or allow the pursuit of bankrupt entrepreneurs for 
years (OECD, 1998). Lower bankruptcy costs encourage the creation of new firms and by 
reducing the stigma of bankruptcy for firms and individuals, entrepreneurs are more likely to 
start new firms (World Bank, 2012).  
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 There is vast literature on how barriers to entry affect entrepreneurship (e.g., Busenitz et 
al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2002) but relatively less work on how barriers to exit affect 
entrepreneurship (Lee et al., 2007). Nonetheless, corporate bankruptcy is very common around 
the world. Lee and colleagues (2007) write “during the 1990s, the annual average number of 
corporate bankruptcies in Japan was 14,500 (Industry Week, 1998), in France 52,000, in Great 
Britain 47,000, and in Germany 21,000 (Claessens and Klapper, 2005) [and] in 2001, 38,540 
businesses in the United States declared bankruptcy (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2003)” (pg. 
257). Many of these bankruptcies are filed by young entrepreneurial firms (Warren and 
Westbrook, 1999; White, 1990). Accordingly, the ramifications of the legal procedures 
pertaining to bankruptcy matter to the entrepreneur.  
 The bankruptcy laws literature provides the logic that ease of exiting a firm is least costly 
in countries with more forgiving bankruptcy laws. The less costly it is, in terms of dealing with a 
failed business, the more likely the entrepreneur will allocate his resources toward productive 
entrepreneurship. This logic leads to the following hypotheses: 
 (H4a) The greater the leniency of bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur in a country, the 
stronger the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and 
productive entrepreneurship 
(H4b) The greater the leniency of bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur in a country, the 
weaker the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and 
unproductive entrepreneurship 
Trade Policies  
 Trade policies determine the amount of restrictions in the process of entrepreneurship 
because they set the level of freedom to exchange product and ideas. In places where trade is 
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restricted the potential entrepreneurs will view being a productive entrepreneur to be a costly 
endeavor because it is costly to access the world market. The more costly it is, in terms of trade, 
for an entrepreneur to engage in productive entrepreneurship, the more likely he will choose to 
allocate his resources toward unproductive entrepreneurship over productive entrepreneurship.   
 In recent decades, nations have become more interdependent through growth in 
international trade (Markusen, 1995). The freedom to exchange and experiment, within and 
across national boundaries, is essential to new combinations of resources in today’s globalized 
world. Sobel (et al., 2007) writes,  
 
“Barriers to either domestic or foreign trade, by their very nature, reduce the number of 
combinations that can be attempted through the reduction in the flow of new and unique 
resources and goods. With a restricted set of potential inputs into the creative process 
some new combinations that might otherwise be profitable are never found, identified 
and exploited. Trade in both resources and goods disseminate information, innovation 
and specialized resources. When that flow is restricted, the creative entrepreneurial 
process suffers, and so does economic progress” (pg. 223-224).  
  
 As described by Sobel (et al, 2007) domestic or foreign trade enable the creative 
destructive process of entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1934). Consequently more entrepreneurial 
activity would be expected in places where trade is not restricted.  
 Trade openness is becoming increasingly more relevant to entrepreneurs because newly 
established firms are playing a greater role in international trade (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004). In 
the international entrepreneurship literature, a research stream on born-global firms has emerged. 
Born-global firms are young in age, usually small in size, and target international markets where 
they have little or no experience (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). They are firms that 
internationalize rapidly after inception, do not follow the traditional theories of incremental firm 
internationalization and see the world as their market (Cavusgil and Knight 2009). Collectively 
the emergence of international entrepreneurial firms, born-global firms and the traditional start-
38 
 
ups that choose to export or import their goods or services, are making trade barriers all the more 
significant to the entrepreneur.  
 This relationship suggests that institutional contexts where trade is restricted are places 
where potential entrepreneurs will view being a productive entrepreneur to be a costly endeavor 
because they will have restricted access to the world market. In places where trade policies are 
closed, entrepreneurs will be more likely to allocate resources toward unproductive behaviors 
because productive entrepreneurship will be less rewarding. This logic leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
(H5a) The greater the openness of trade policies in a country, the stronger the 
relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and productive 
entrepreneurship 
(H5b) The greater the openness of trade policies in a country, the weaker the relationship 
between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and unproductive entrepreneurship 
Labor Markets  
 Productive entrepreneurship requires dealing with labor regulations because one of the 
many challenges entrepreneurs endure is the ability to efficiently and effectively manage human 
resources. Prior studies have shown that flexible labor markets are better environments for new 
firm creation because of the liabilities of newness and size (Autio, 2005; Baughn and Neupert, 
2003).   In flexible labor markets (e.g., United Kingdom) entrepreneurs are able to adjust 
workforce size by hiring or firing employees to meet unexpected demands (Baughn et al., 2008). 
On the contrary, in more strictly regulated labor markets (e.g., Italy) entrepreneurs are inhibited 
from making such adjustments (Cornelius and Zhang, 2002; Nickell, 1997; Schuler & 
Florkowski, 1996). The cost of labor regulation may act as a deterrent for entrepreneurs because 
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the cost of compliance may be too costly for the small businesses employer (Klapper et al., 
2006).  
 Labor markets are imperfect. Governmental regulations of labor are set as a means to 
prevent rents being extracted in the employment relationship. Proponents of labor regulation 
argue that if governments did not intervene then the consequences would be employers abusing 
workers, discriminating against disadvantaged groups, underpaying workers who are immobile, 
and/or firing workers without cause (Botero et al, 2004). However, labor regulation can be 
viewed from the potential entrepreneur perspective as well. The overregulated labor market in 
terms of too favorable to the employee (e.g., difficulty in firing poor performing employees) can 
be costs to the potential entrepreneur.  
 The complex system of laws and institutions set to protect the interests of workers differs 
across countries (Van Stel et al., 2007). For example, many West European countries, such as 
Germany, France and Belgium impose significant notice and severance pay requirements on 
employers who lay off workers (Abraham and Houseman, 1994). In contrast, places like the 
United States do not require advance notice of layoffs and consequently workers often received 
little or no warning prior to being let go and those permanently laid off frequently receive no 
severance. Nonetheless, workers in the U.S. may seek payments from the unemployment 
insurance system. Therefore, the difference of labor market regulations across countries is in the 
entity that will compensate the laid off worker – responsibility of the public system or the firm 
itself.  
 Entrepreneurship requires the ability to effectively and efficiently manage human 
resources to act in accordance with unforeseen demand. Inflexible labor markets are where 
prospective entrepreneurs may view becoming a productive entrepreneur to be a costly allocation 
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of effort. The more costly it is, in terms of hiring or firing employees, for an entrepreneur to 
engage in productive entrepreneurship, the more likely he will choose to allocate his resources 
toward unproductive entrepreneurship over productive entrepreneurship. Accordingly, any 
impediments to an entrepreneurs’ ability to efficiently and effectively manage human resources 
matter to the entrepreneur. This logic leads to the following hypotheses:   
(H6a) The greater the flexibility of labor markets in a country, the stronger the 
relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and productive 
entrepreneurship 
(H6b) The greater the flexibility of labor markets in a country, the weaker the 
relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and unproductive 
entrepreneurship 
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CHAPTER 4 – DATA AND METHODS  
 This dissertation is distinct in combining data sources specific to entrepreneurship with 
more general sources to develop reliable indicators for socio-cultural measures, the regulatory 
environment, and the allocation of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship across 
countries. To analyze the empirical predictions, I construct a country-level longitudinal dataset 
that integrates indicators of entrepreneurship productivity (e.g., Global Enterprise Monitor ) with 
more general country-level economic and socio-cultural indicators (e.g., World Bank Survey) 
from 2004-2008 across the following developed and emerging nations: Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, 
Latvia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, 
United States, and Uruguay.   
Data  
Dependent Variables 
 This dissertation employs two cross-country comparative dependent variables: the 
national rate of productive entrepreneurship and national rate of unproductive entrepreneurship.   
Productive Entrepreneurial Activity  
 To measure productive entrepreneurship I draw from the world’s leading, and most 
comprehensive, study of productive entrepreneurial dynamics – the Global Enterprise Monitor 
(GEM) project (GEM, 2011).  The GEM project is a partnership between London Business 
School and Babson College that has grown from covering 10 countries in 1999 to more recently 
including over 175,000 people in 59 economies. GEM seeks to measure differences in levels of 
entrepreneurial activity between countries to uncover the factors leading to levels of 
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entrepreneurship, and provides policy suggestions that may enhance national levels of 
entrepreneurship.  
 This dissertation uses the GEM project measures of productive entrepreneurship named 
“Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity” (TEA). The TEA measure comprises the sum of all 
entrepreneurs in given year in a country that have taken the necessary steps to establish a new 
firm but have not yet paid wages or salaries, called nascent entrepreneurs, and those that have 
paid wages or salaries, called new business owners. Despite if they have paid wages are not they 
have established a firm which has been in business for a period greater than three months but less 
than 24 months (GEM 2008 report).  Thus productive entrepreneurship is measures as the sum of 
all entrepreneurs in a given year in a country which have established a new firm:  
Productive Entrepreneurship = (Total nascent entrepreneurs) + (Total new business owner-managers) 
 It is important to note that the number of individuals establishing new firms may not 
indicate the total number of businesses in formal operation in a given year because some people 
may be running multiple businesses or some newly established business may have multiple 
founders (GEM, 2008). Despite this small limitation, the GEM database is still the best proxy for 
capturing estimates of total levels of productive entrepreneurship in a country in a given year.  
  In my dataset the countries with the most amount of productive entrepreneurship are 
Uruguay, India and Columbia. The countries with the least amount of productive 
entrepreneurship are Japan, Hungary and Russia.  
Unproductive Entrepreneurial Activity  
  Constructing a reliable measure for the second dependent variable, ‘unproductive 
entrepreneurship’, is more challenging as individuals engaged in unproductive entrepreneurship 
may not wish to be identified, thus there may be a problem with observability.   The estimation 
of the informal economy activities can be considered as a “scientific passion for knowing the 
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unknown” (Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004 pg.4). Although challenging, there are several 
approaches for measuring the size of the informal economy (unproductive entrepreneurship). For 
a review of older and alternative measures, not used in this dissertation with their description, 
advantages, disadvantages, assumptions and limitations; see Appendix 1. 
 To overcome these challenges, I employ two indirect measures of unproductive 
entrepreneurship.  First, I draw from Schneider and colleagues (2010) using the size of the 
unofficial economy (derived via structural equation modeling) as a proxy for unproductive 
entrepreneurship. Schneider and colleagues (2010) estimate the size of the unofficial economy as 
a percentage of total GDP with the MIMIC approach in Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).   
Their method is an improvement on previous work, because they created a unique dataset which 
allows for comparable informal economy empirics.  They combine the traditional approaches 
(e.g., currency approach) with more recent measures to estimate the size of the informal 
economy for 162 countries. 
In my dataset the countries with the most amount of estimated unproductive 
entrepreneurship are Columbia, Brazil and Argentina. The countries with the estimated least 
amount of unproductive entrepreneurship are the United States, Japan and New Zealand.  
 The second measure for unproductive entrepreneurship is from the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey, which incorporates a question to local managers regarding the degree of 
competition they face from unproductive entrepreneurs. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 
provide the world's most comprehensive company-level data in emerging markets and 
developing economies (World Bank, 2012), and are conducted through face-to-face interviews 
with top managers and business owners in over 130,000 companies in 135 economies. 
Essentially, this measure captures the manager’s perception that competing firms may be 
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engaged in unproductive activity such as smuggling, breaching intellectual property rights, tax 
evasion, counterfeiting, and generally skirting regulations or other law prescriptions. This 
definition fits well with how unproductive entrepreneurship is defined in the literature (e.g. 
Baumol, 1990).    
In my dataset the countries with the most amount of estimated unproductive 
entrepreneurship as calculated by enterprise are Uruguay, Columbia and Brazil. The countries 
with the estimated least amount of unproductive entrepreneurship as calculated by enterprise are 
the Croatia, Hungary and Chile.  
Independent Variables  
Socio-Cultural Measures: sources 
  The baseline independent variable (pro-entrepreneurial values) which measures the 
direct effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship is an aggregation of key socio-cultural measures from the World Value Survey 
(WVS) and GEM.   
 The World Value Survey (WVS) is a worldwide network of social scientists studying 
societal value systems and how those values impact social and political life. The WVS has 
conducted surveys in 97 societies that contain almost 90 percent of the world’s population. In 
order to monitor changes, the WVS has executed five waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2007. This 
dissertation uses wave 3 conducted between 1995 and 1999 to allow for sufficient lags and 
casual analysis between cultural values and more recent levels of entrepreneurial activity.  
Socio-Cultural Measures: variables 
 The first element of this aggregate measure is tolerance for ambiguity.  Some countries 
teach their members that they must learn to live in an ‘ambiguous world’ (McGrath et al., 1992) 
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and therefore these individuals develop a higher tolerance for ambiguity. In this study, tolerance 
for ambiguity is drawn from the WVS survey which assesses a societies’ level of comfort with 
ambiguity based on the degree to which new ideas are preferred to non-changing traditional ideas 
that persist over long periods of time. This variable is used with its original coding of a range 
from 1 to 10 where (1) represents “Ideas that stood test of time are generally best” and (10) 
“New ideas are generally better than old ones”.    
  The second measure (egalitarian value systems), is grounded in the logic that societies 
with egalitarian value systems socially encourage individual initiative (Pinillos and Reyes, 2009) 
regardless of individual status or rank.  Thus people in these societies feel empowered in regards 
to freedom and control over their lives. The WVS survey question for this measure asks 
respondents, “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, 
while other people feel that they have no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this 
scale where [1] means "none at all" and [10] means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom 
of choice and control you feel you have over your life”. This variable is used with its original 
coding of a range from 1 to 10. 
 The third measure (acceptance of individuality), draws from the reasoning that 
entrepreneurs are motivated individuals who rely primarily on themselves rather than others to 
formulate and implement goals.  Thus they are commonly categorized as believing in their own 
abilities and feeling a high level of autonomy.  I measure Acceptance of Individuality through 
the WVS Autonomy Index which calculates the degree of autonomy from four survey questions 
on child values. The logic is that what we teach our children is a reflection of core values.  The 
WVS provides respondents a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home 
and asks which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Respondents are permitted to 
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select all of them.  The responses are coded as (1) if mentioned and (0) if not and then entered 
into the autonomy index formula.  The four qualities are: (a) Religion/Faith, (b) Obedience, (c) 
Independence, and (d) Determination/Perseverance. The formula as defined by the WVS is: 
Autonomy Index = (Religion/Faith + Obedience) – (Independence + Determination/Perseverance) 
 The answers range from (-2) to (+2).  For example, if both of the ‘non-autonomy’ 
responses (Religion/Faith or Obedience) were mention but none of the autonomy responses 
(Independence or Determination/Perseverance) were selected then the formula would be (1+1) – 
(0) = 2; and so forth depending on the combination of responses. Because the formula is 
calculated in a way that higher scores reflect ‘non-autonomy’ traits and lower scores reflect high 
autonomy traits, I reverse coded the raw scores by subtracting the given score from 2 so high 
scores reflect high autonomy and low scores reflect low autonomy.  
 The final aggregate measure (portrayal by media) is derived from the communication 
literature which postulates media is an outlet that reinforces the value systems of a society 
(Perse, 2001). Accordingly, the fourth measure of societal values is captured by the overall 
media coverage of entrepreneurship in a country. To measure this socio-cultural variable, I use 
the publically available data from the GEM. The GEM study asks: In your country, do you often 
see stories in the public media about successful new businesses? The answers were compiled as 
the total percentage average of yes responses. Countries with higher scores are those with greater 
media coverage of entrepreneurship. This variable is lagged by one year for casual analysis. 
 Finally, I construct a pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural index by standardizing and then 
adding each of the 4 allocative-neutral aggregated variables described above.  Thus, my variable 
“Pro-Entrepreneurial Value” is the sum of all 4 standardized socio-cultural variables.   
     For an overview of data sources and detailed questions with coding see Table 1 and Table 
2, respectively.  
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Determinants of the Allocation of Entrepreneurially Activity: sources 
 The regulatory environment of country has been measured in a variety of ways. The data 
for this dissertation, focused on the costs of productive entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurs’ 
ability to appropriate rents, are collected from the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation. The 
World Bank, an international financial institution created in 1944, collects macro-level data to 
develop efficient policies, monitor the implementation of poverty reduction strategies and 
progress towards global goals. At the World Bank, the Development Data Group coordinates 
data work to maintain a number of databases. Two of these databases are the World 
Development Indicators and the Enterprise Survey Data.  
World Development Indicators 
 The World Development Indicators (WDI) presents the most current and accurate global 
development data available for 216 countries between 1960 and 2010 with 1260 variables. One 
of these measures is part of the Doing Business Project. This project has been conducting 
research on the ease of doing business since 2004. It is the first quantitative measurement of 
business regulation.  Doing Business records “all procedures officially required for an 
entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business” (World Bank, 
2010 pg.1).  The laws, regulations and public information on business entry of each country and 
a list of procedures, including time and cost of setup, is documented by the World Bank.  The 
report covers 183 economies and includes their domestic laws and regulations and administrative 
requirements for setting up a business. The World Bank’s Doing Business Report provides a 
comparative analysis of rules and regulations across countries.  
The Heritage Foundation 
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 The Heritage Foundation measures economic freedom in 10 separate areas, grouped in 
four broad categories – Rule of Law, Government, Regulatory Efficiency, and Open Markets.  
Each freedom is scored on a scale of 0 to 100 where higher scores represent greater freedom.   
 The socio-cultural index variable I developed is interacted with each of the rules and 
regulation measures to capture the amount and the allocation of entrepreneurship for each of the 
25 countries between 2004 and 2008.  I make the conjecture that the relationship is linear and 
thus improvements to rules and regulations (increases) will lead to greater outcomes (more 
productive and less unproductive). This conjecture is consistent with the previous empirical 
studies of Baumol’s allocation of entrepreneurship theory (e.g. Sobel, 2008).   
Determinants of the Allocation of Entrepreneurially Activity: variables 
 I postulated earlier in this dissertation that there are number of conditions that will 
moderate the direct effect of socio-cultural values on productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship. The first of these moderating effects is administrative barriers to entry which is 
pulled from the Doing Business Project of the World Bank. This measure is the total number of 
official procedures required or commonly done in practice to start up and formally operate a firm 
in the selected country. A procedure is defined as an exchange between the company founders 
and any external parties. Examples of external parties are government agencies, lawyers, 
auditors, and notaries. Internal interactions such as those between founders and employees are 
not counted as procedures.  Each individual visit to an office, even if those offices are located in 
the same building are counted as a separate procedure. Additionally, if several visits to the same 
office are required then each visit is counted as separate procedures. Exchanges with public 
agencies (e.g., company seal required) are counted as individual procedures as well.  Only 
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procedures which are required for every type of business are included whereas any industry-
specific procedures are excluded.  
 In my dataset this variable was reverse coded so higher scores represent less 
administrative barriers to entry. The countries with the least administrative barriers to entry are 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The countries with most administrative barriers to entry are 
Uganda, Brazil and Argentina.   
The second moderating effect, property rights and contract enforceability, captures the 
ability of an individual to accumulate property rights that are secured by ‘clear enforceable 
laws’, the degree to which the government enforces those laws, as well as businesses ability to 
enforce the agreed upon contracts. The source of these data is the Heritage Foundation. The more 
certain the legal protection of property the higher a country’s score and conversely the less 
certain the legal protection of property the lower a country’s score.  Scores are on a range from 
0-100 with higher scores capturing stronger property rights and enforceability of contracts.  The 
scores are graded according to a list of criteria where a perfect score of 100 represents that 
“private property is guaranteed by the government, the court system enforces contracts 
efficiently and quickly, and the justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private 
property” (Heritage Foundation).  A score of 0 are places where “private property is outlawed, 
and all property belongs to the state. People do not have the right to sue others and do not have 
access to the courts” (Heritage Foundation). Scores are in increments of 10 moving away from 
100 and toward 0 as private property become less guaranteed by the government, court system 
enforcement of contracts become less efficient and as the justice system becomes less likely to 
punish those who unlawfully confiscate private property.  
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In my dataset the countries with the least well-defined property rights and contract 
enforceability are China, Russia and Uganda. The countries with most well-defined property 
rights and contract enforceability are Finland, Australia, and the United States.  
The third independent moderating variable is bankruptcy laws in a country. The World 
Bank measures bankruptcy law costs by the cents on the dollar recouped by creditors (World 
Bank, 2012).  Following Lee and colleagues (2011), I use the ‘rate of recovery from a closing’ as 
a proxy for measuring the degree of an entrepreneur's “fresh start” as specified by the bankruptcy 
laws. The recovery costs calculate the cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, 
and employees) recover from an insolvent firm.  Assuming that the greater the amount claimants 
recover from an insolvent firm, the less is recovered by entrepreneurs themselves, thereby the 
less likely they will have a fresh start (Lee et al., 2011). Scores for cost of bankruptcy range from 
0 to 100 cents. I reverse code this measure by calculating fresh start as one dollar (100 cents) 
minus the rate of recovery (cents per dollar) by others and as done by Lee and colleagues (2007).  
In my dataset the countries with the least lenient bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur 
(most strict) are Norway, Japan and Canada. The countries with the most lenient bankruptcy laws 
for the entrepreneur are Turkey, Brazil and Uruguay.  
The fourth and fifth moderating variables, respectively trade freedom and labor 
flexibility, are also derived from Heritage Foundation data. The trade freedom component 
measures the absence of barriers, tariff and non-tariff, on exported or imported goods and 
services based on the trade-weighted average tariff rate and the non-tariff barriers (NTBs).  The 
equation used is: 
 Trade Freedomi = (((Tariffmax–Tariffi )/(Tariffmax–Tariffmin )) * 100) – NTBi 
 The “Trade Freedomi represents the trade freedom in country i; Tariffmax and Tariffmin 
represent the upper and lower bounds for tariff rates (%); and Tariffi represents the weighted 
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average tariff rate (%) in country i. The minimum tariff is naturally zero percent, and the upper 
bound was set as 50 percent. An NTB penalty is then subtracted from the base score” (Heritage 
Foundation). No penalties are given for countries in which NTBs are not used to limit 
international trade.  Penalties of 5 (NTBs are uncommon, protecting few goods and services, 
and/or have very limited impact on international trade), 10 (NTBs are used to protect certain 
goods and services and impede some international trade, 15 (NTBs are widespread across many 
goods and services and/or act to impede a majority of potential international trade) or 20 (NTBs 
are used extensively across many goods and services and/or act to effectively impede a 
significant amount of international trade) are given per the amount of NTBs used.   The 
categories of NTBs used for penalties are quantity restrictions (e.g., export limitations), price 
restrictions (e.g., antidumping duties), regulatory restrictions (e.g., licensing), investment 
restrictions (e.g., financial control), customs restrictions (e.g. advance deposit required) and 
direct government intervention (e.g., national taxes).  Scores are converted to a 100-point scale 
with high scores reflect the most open trade policies. 
 In my dataset the countries with the least open trade policies are India, Russia and China. 
The countries with the most open trade policies are Norway, Canada and Croatia.  
 The labor flexibility component is a quantitative measure of various aspects of the legal 
and regulatory framework of a country’s labor market (Heritage Foundation, 2012). Six 
quantitative factors are equally weighted to calculate the labor freedom component. They are: 
ratio of minimum wage to the average value added per worker, hindrance to hiring additional 
workers, rigidity of hours, difficulty of firing redundant employees, legally mandated notice 
period, and mandatory severance pay.  Scores are converted to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 
with higher scores representing greater labor market flexibility. 
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In my dataset the countries with the least labor market flexibility are Turkey, Argentina 
and Germany. The countries with the most labor market flexibility are Sweden, Chile and 
Russia. 
Control Variables   
In addition to the socio-cultural indicators and moderating regulation variables, I have 
several control variables that prior research has identified as affecting the level of 
entrepreneurship.  Each control variable is lagged by one year for sufficient casual analysis.    
First, I control for societies with initiative-taking in jobs. The WVS asked respondents if the 
opportunity to use initiative was an important aspect of a job. While taking initiative at a job may 
be very different from the resourcefulness of starting a new firm, societies who value initiative 
taking in a job should have more individuals who act the same outside of the established business 
in which they are employed and take the initiative to start a new venture.   
Second, I control for how much societies value competition as literature has identified 
competition an important environmental factor for entrepreneurship to flourish (Lee and 
Peterson, 2000). This dissertation builds from the theory of culture as defined by Hofstede (1980, 
1991, and 2001). Competition is used as a control variable instead of an independent variable 
because the literature has used it as a control variable and because it falls outside of the spectrum 
of Hostede’s identified cultural variables. The WVS asked respondents if they agree with the 
statement that competition is good because it stimulates people to work hard and develop new 
ideas or if they more agree with competition is harmful because it brings out the worst in people.  
Societies that value competition will work hard to develop new ideas in order to successfully 
compete.  
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Third, I control for several macro-economic factors. Specifically, I control for the age 
structure of the population because it reflects an important demographic characteristic which 
may influences a country’s level of entrepreneurship (e.g. Bowen and Clercq, 2008; Verheul et 
al., 2002). When there are more people of working age (15-64 years old) then there is a greater 
likelihood for entrepreneur behavior because there are more people of the age to be an 
entrepreneur.  
Fourth, prior research has identified the relationship between economic activity and level 
of entrepreneurship (Bowen and Clercq, 2008; Carree et al., 2002). There is a positive 
relationship between domestic growth and levels of entrepreneurship across countries and time 
(Carree et al., 2002) because there is greater opportunity when there is growth of national 
income.  
Fifth, the onset of the world financial crisis in 2007-2008 may have impacted levels of 
entrepreneurship due to opportunity costs affecting both opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs 
(Reynolds et al., 2002; Sternberg et al., 2006).   I control for this macro-economic variable as 
dummy year 2008 to capture the start of this world economic turmoil. An overview of all data 
sources, with summary statistics of key variables is shown in Table 3. 
Finally, the trustworthiness of government officials is an important country institutional 
variable related to allocation of entrepreneurial activity. The background institution (Whitley, 
1994) is the extent to which public officials use their public power to capture rents for 
themselves (Choi and Thum, 2005). Extant research has shown that lower levels of trust in 
public officials are associated with lower productivity or output growth across countries (Sachs 
and Warner, 1995) and thus entrepreneurs may allocate toward unproductive activities in places 
where trust in public officials is lacking. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
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Index (CPI), first released in 1995, ranks more than 150 countries by their perceived levels of 
corruption in public officials, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.   
Methods 
To analyze the empirical predictions, I construct a country-level longitudinal dataset. In 
the analysis of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, I used the country-level as the unit 
of analysis because this dissertation examines the differences in level and allocation of 
entrepreneurship. For productive entrepreneurship, the country-level variable is the total number 
of registered firms in a country in the given year of analysis. For unproductive entrepreneurship, 
the country-level variable is the total estimated size of the unofficial economy for one measure 
and then the estimated size of the obstacle that unofficial business create for official business for 
the other measure. Accordantly, the final panel dataset observes the entrepreneurial activities of 
countries across time (2004-2008). 
 I use OLS regression models clustered by country to predict the relationship between the 
independent variables and moderating variables on the two dependent variables. As a robustness 
check, I estimate random effects models and fixed effects models. The Hausman test concluded 
that fixed effects were preferred to random effects models with the Prob>chi2 = 0.9962 for 
productive entrepreneurship and 1.0000 for unproductive entrepreneurship. The fixed effects 
models concluded the exact same results or stronger results as the OLS regression models 
clustered by country.  I selected to run OLS regression models for my final analysis because of 
the small number of observations per country. 
 The final sample is 25 countries between 2004 and 2008 for both dependent variables – 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. In order to illuminate the effects of developing 
versus emerging nations and because unproductive entrepreneurship is challenge to measure, I 
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include an additional measure of unproductive entrepreneurship only developing nations for 
unproductive entrepreneurship. There is a loss of sample size because this source covers 12 
developing countries.   The descriptive statistics and correlations of these two datasets are 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. The correlation between productive entrepreneurship and the 
unproductive entrepreneurships measure is low at 0.182. The correlation between the two 
unproductive entrepreneurship measures is in the middle range at 0.539. 
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CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 In this chapter, I describe and interpret the results of my statistical analyses which test 
the effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on levels of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship and the moderating effect of rules and regulations on these relationships.   
Results 
Dependent Variable: Productive Entrepreneurship  
 Table 5 reports results of the OLS regression models (clustered by country) for the 
dependent variable: productive entrepreneurship.  
 Model 1 of Table 5 includes the control variables only. The results shown in Model 2 of 
Table 5 provide strong support for Hypothesis 1a, which predicted greater levels of pro-
entrepreneurial values in a country will lead to greater levels of productive entrepreneurship. For 
one standard deviation increase in the pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural index, the amount of 
productive entrepreneurship in a country would be expected to increase by 125.3%, holding all 
other variables constant.  
 Model 3 introduces Administrative barriers to Entry. I observe the interaction term is 
negative and insignificant.  Figure 2 provides the marginal effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio-
cultural values on productive entrepreneurship as administrative barriers lessen. The solid line of 
this figure demonstrates the marginal effect of the pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on 
productive entrepreneurship as the number of procedures to start a business (administrative 
barriers) decreases from 19 procedures to 2 procedures. The figure confirms the insignificant 
effect of administrative barriers to entry by graphically showing how the marginal effect of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship is inconsequential across 
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the entire range. There is virtually no effect (a straight line).  Thus, hypothesis 2a is not 
supported.  
 Model 4 introduces Property rights and contract enforceability. I observe the interaction 
term is negative and significant. Figure 3 provides the marginal effect of pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship as property rights become more well-
defined. The solid line of this figure demonstrates how the marginal effect of the pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship changes as the property 
rights and contract enforceability index increases and the 95% confidence interval, the dotted 
line in the figure, shows the conditions under which the impact of pro-entrepreneurial socio-
cultural values on productive entrepreneurship is statistically significant. The graph in Figure 3 
confirms that this effect holds for the entire range and shows the marginal effect of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship weakens (the opposite of the 
predicted direction) as property rights and contract enforceability become more well-defined.   
Thus, hypothesis 3a is not supported.    
 Similar negative results are found in Model 5 for leniency of bankruptcy laws. I observe 
the interaction term is negative and significant. Figure 4 provides the marginal effect of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship as bankruptcy laws become 
more lenient. The solid line of this figure demonstrates how the marginal effect of the pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship changes as the 
entrepreneur’s recovery rate of a bankrupt firm increases. The 95% confidence interval, the 
dotted line in the figure, shows the conditions under which the impact of pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship is statistically significant as bankruptcy 
laws become more lenient for the entrepreneur. The graph in Figure 4 shows a negative and 
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significant effect holds for the entire range. Thus, the marginal effect of pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship weakens (opposite of the predicted 
direction) as bankruptcy laws become more lenient. Thus, hypothesis 4a is not supported. 
    Model 6 and Model 7 includes trade freedom and labor flexibility, respectfully, which 
show insignificant coefficients for each interaction term and the insignificance is confirmed per 
graphic illustration across the entire range.  Thus H5a and H6a are not supported. 
Dependent Variable: Unproductive Entrepreneurship (Schneider et al., 2010) 
 Table 6 reports the results of the OLS regression models (clustered by country) for the 
second dependent variable: unproductive entrepreneurship as calculated by Schneider (et al., 
2010).  
 Model 8 includes the control variables only. The results shown in Model 9 of Table 6 
provide strong support for Hypothesis 1b at the .067 level, which predicted greater levels of pro-
entrepreneurial values in a country will lead to greater levels of unproductive entrepreneurship. 
For one standard deviation increase in the pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural index, the amount of 
unproductive entrepreneurship in a country would be expected to increase by 75%, holding all 
other variables constant. 
 Model 10 introduces Administrative barriers to Entry. I observe that the independent 
effect of Administrative barriers to entry and the interaction term are negative and insignificant.  
This is confirmed via the graph in figure 7. There is no marginal effect of pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship. Thus, H2b is not supported.  
    Model 11-14 includes Property rights and contract enforceability, bankruptcy laws, 
trade freedom and labor flexibility, respectfully, which all show insignificant coefficients for 
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each interaction term and per graphic illustration insignificant across the entire range. Thus, H3b, 
H4b, H5b, and H6b are not supported.   
Dependent Variable: Unproductive Entrepreneurship (Enterprise Survey) 
  In order to illuminate the effects of developing versus emerging nations, and because 
unproductive entrepreneurship is extremely challenging to measure, I employ a second test of 
hypotheses 1b-6b using a second measure per the World Bank Enterprise Survey3.  Table 7 
reports results of the OLS regression models (clustered by country) for the dependent variable: 
unproductive entrepreneurship by measured by the Enterprise Survey Data.  
 While the positive effect remains for Model 16 (Hypothesis 1b), there is a loss of 
statistical significance which may be a consequence of the reduced sample size.  
 Model 17 introduces Administrative barriers to Entry. I observe a negative and 
significant result for the interaction term.  Figure 12 provides the marginal effect of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship as administrative barriers 
lessen. The solid line of this figure demonstrates the marginal effect of the pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship as the number of procedures to start a 
business (administrative barriers) decreases. The range is from 19 to 2 procedures.  The 
administrative barrier to entry variable is reverse coded so higher scores on the x-axis of Figure 
12 represent fewer procedures (e.g. 20 is 2 procedures). The graph in Figure 12 shows that when 
administrative barriers are high (above 12 procedures) there is a positive effect of pro-
entrepreneurial socio cultural values on levels of unproductive entrepreneurship. The graph also 
shows that when administrative barriers are low (less than 6 procedures) the effect of socio-
cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship flips from positive to negative.  Therefore, 
                                                           
3 The World Enterprise Survey Data includes only developing countries (12 out of the 25 
countries in sample) 
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when administrative barriers are low, an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will 
lead to a decrease in levels of unproductive entrepreneurship.  This supports Hypothesis 2b.  
  Model 18 introduces Property rights and contract enforceability. I observe the interaction 
term is negative and significant as predicted. Figure 13 provides the marginal effect of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship as property rights become 
more well-defined. The solid line of this figure demonstrates how the marginal effect of the pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive entrepreneurship changes as the property 
rights and contract enforceability index increases. The range for property rights and contract 
enforceability is 20-90 (index). The 95% confidence interval, the dotted line in the figure, shows 
the conditions under which the impact of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on productive 
entrepreneurship is statistically significant as property rights and contract enforceability become 
more well-defined. The graph in Figure 13 shows as property rights and contract enforceability 
become more well-defined, an increase in socio-cultural values will lead to a decrease in 
unproductive entrepreneurship. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is supported.   
 Model 19 introduces leniency of bankruptcy laws. I observe the interaction term is 
insignificant. Figure 14 provides the marginal effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values 
on unproductive entrepreneurship as bankruptcy laws become more lenient. The graph in Figure 
14 shows a negative and insignificant effect holds for the entire range. Thus, Hypothesis 4b is 
not supported.     
 Model 20 includes trade freedom which shows insignificant negative coefficients for the 
interaction terms. Figure 15 provides the marginal effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural 
values on unproductive entrepreneurship as trade policies become more open. The figure 
confirms the insignificant effect of trade freedom by graphically illustrated how the marginal 
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effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship is 
inconsequential across the entire range. There is virtually no effect.  Thus, hypothesis 5b is not 
supported. 
 Finally, I find negative and significant results for labor flexibility for the interaction term 
in model 21.  Figure 16 provides the marginal effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values 
on unproductive entrepreneurship as labor markets become more flexible. The solid line of this 
figure demonstrates how the marginal effect of the pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on 
unproductive entrepreneurship changes as the labor market index improves.  The 95% 
confidence interval, the dotted line in the figure, shows the conditions under which the impact of 
pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship is statistically 
significant as labor markets become more flexible for the entrepreneur. The graph in Figure 16 
shows as labor markets become more flexible, an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural 
values will lead to a decrease in unproductive entrepreneurship. Thus, Hypothesis 6b is 
supported.    
Robustness test 
 For robustness tests, I run the same analysis using fixed-effects models. I select fixed- 
effects for my robustness test over random effects because of the results of the Hausman test 
showing a probability of 0.9962 for productive and 1.00 for unproductive concluding that fixed 
effects is preferred. The fixed effects models yield the same results as the OLS, clustered by 
country, models. Thus, this confirms the robustness of my models and results.  Table 8 and Table 
9 show these results.  
  In sum, in this base interpretation, I find both productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship can result from the same pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values (H1a, H1b) 
62 
 
and that the impact of rules and regulations on the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values on levels of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship are mixed.  
 When administrative barriers to entry are high, there is a positive effect of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on levels of unproductive entrepreneurship and when 
administrative barriers are low, an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will lead 
to decrease in levels of unproductive entrepreneurship (H2b).  Additionally, as property rights 
and contract enforcement become more well-defined (H3a, H3b) increases in pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values result in a decrease in both types of entrepreneurship – productive and 
unproductive. Also, as bankruptcy laws become more lenient, increases in pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values lead to decreases in productive entrepreneurship.   Although the results for 
property right and bankruptcy laws show an opposite of the predicted effect for productive 
entrepreneurship, they offer promising insights to future research which are discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6.    
 No results are found for the level of trade freedom in a country on productive (H5a) or 
unproductive (H5b) entrepreneurship. This lack of results may be due to data limitations or 
perhaps trade, although important to the international entrepreneur, may not matter to the 
average entrepreneur.  Finally, as predicted, flexible labor markets (H6b) in a country weaken the 
relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and unproductive 
entrepreneurship as predicted. Hence, as labor markets become more flexible, an increase in pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will lead to a decrease in levels of unproductive 
entrepreneurship.  
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Additional Analysis  
 My original analysis included the entire range for each interaction variables where higher 
scores represented the least administrative barriers to entry (H2), the most well-defined property 
rights (H3), the most lenient bankruptcy laws (H4), the most open trade policies (H5) and the 
most flexible labor markets (H6). In this refined analysis, I divided each of these interaction 
terms into three sub-categories of low, medium, and high scores to unpack the effect of rules and 
regulations among these groupings and assess if differences exist across the different categorical 
levels4. To test this, I ran OLS regression models clustered by country including the three 
categories (low, medium, high) for hypotheses 2-6. The results are shown in table 10, 11 and 12 
for dependent variables: productive entrepreneurship, unproductive entrepreneurship (Schneider 
et al., 2010), and unproductive entrepreneurship (Enterprise Survey), respectfully.   
 The additional analysis produced very interesting results. First, for the dependent variable 
productive entrepreneurship the original analysis included the entire range for the interaction 
variables and showed no support for any of the moderating rules and regulations hypotheses 
(H2a-H6a). However, the refined analysis shows a consistent pattern of pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values leading to less of productive entrepreneurship in low and high ranges of 
rules and regulations relative to what it produced for productive entrepreneurship in moderate 
ranges.   
 Specifically, the original analysis showed property rights (H3a) to be statistically 
significant in the opposite of the predicted direction (negative).  In this additional analysis, 
property rights (H3a) still yielded negative, significant results but the refined analysis shows an 
                                                           
4
 The three categories (low, medium, high) were selected instead of quadratic equations primarily because the 
quadratic models with interaction terms were extremely difficult to interpret due to the number of squared terms 
and different signs in the equation.  The categories provide the same analysis as a quadratic equation except does 
not show if the coefficients differ in a statistically significant way. To correct for this, I conduct an additional test to 
formally compare coefficients which allows me to make more precise interpretations of the results.  
64 
 
increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will lead to a decrease in productive 
entrepreneurship in conditions where property rights are not well-defined (low ranges) or too 
well-defined (high ranges). As shown in model 37 of table 10, the coefficient for the middle 
range (-0.016) is higher than either the lower range coefficient (-0.023) or the higher range 
coefficient (-0.036). 
 This pattern shows an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will lead to a 
relative decrease in productive entrepreneurship when property rights are not well-defined (low 
ranges) or too well-defined (high ranges) relative to what it produces in moderate ranges. This 
demonstrates that property rights will not push an entrepreneur into productive entrepreneurship 
but if too vague or too well-defined then property rights will discourage an entrepreneur from 
being productive.   
 In this additional analysis, bankruptcy laws (H4a) showed similar results as just 
described. The refined analysis shows an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values 
will lead to a decrease in productive entrepreneurship when bankruptcy laws are too strict (low 
ranges) or too lenient (high ranges) for the entrepreneur.  As shown in model 38 of table 10, the 
coefficient for the middle range (0.028) is higher than either the lower range coefficient (-0.038) 
or the higher range coefficient (-0.026). 
 This pattern shows an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will lead to a 
decrease in productive entrepreneurship when bankruptcy laws are too strict (low ranges) or too 
lenient (high ranges) for the entrepreneur relative to what it produces in moderate ranges. When 
bankruptcy laws are very lenient on the entrepreneur it may be risky for the financial backer 
because such circumstances make it easy for the entrepreneur to walk away from a failing firm. 
Accordantly, the financial backer may be less likely to support an entrepreneur and thus there is 
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less unproductive entrepreneurship.  On the other spectrum, when bankruptcy laws become too 
costly for the entrepreneur in terms of being too strict then the potential financial hardships of a 
failed firm may deter an entrepreneur from being productive. When bankruptcy laws allow for 
more shared risk (middle ranges) between financial backer and entrepreneurs then they do not 
discourage productive entrepreneurship. This demonstrates that bankruptcy laws will not push an 
entrepreneur into productive entrepreneurship but if too costly for the financial backer and/or the 
entrepreneur then they will discourage productive behaviors.   
 Hypotheses 5a and 6a show similar patterns. As shown in model 39 of table 10, the 
coefficient for the middle range (-0.009) is higher than either the lower range coefficient (-0.012) 
or the higher range coefficient (-0.008). This pattern suggests that an increase in pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will lead to a decrease in productive entrepreneurship when 
trade policies are the least open (low ranges) or too open (high ranges) relative to what it 
produces in moderate ranges.  
 The same pattern is present for labor market flexibility. As shown in model 40 of table 
10, the coefficient for the middle range (0.012) is higher than either the lower range coefficient 
(0.005) or the higher range coefficient (0.011).This pattern suggests that increase an pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values will lead to a decrease in productive entrepreneurship when 
labor markets are not flexible (low ranges) or too flexible (high ranges) relative to what it 
produces in moderate ranges.   
 This consistent pattern of less productive entrepreneurship in low and high ranges of 
rules and regulations and relatively more productive entrepreneurship in the middle ranges 
supports that institutions matter when they provide the maximum ability for the productive 
entrepreneur to capture rents from efforts at the minimal possible cost.   
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 The opposite patterns exist for unproductive entrepreneurship (for both measures). As 
shown in model 42-45 of table 11 for Schneider (et al., 2010) and model 47-50 of table 12 for the 
enterprise survey data, the same four rules and regulation variables (property rights, bankruptcy 
laws, trade freedom and labor market flexibility) which showed the pattern of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values leading to less productive entrepreneurship in high and low 
ranges of rules and regulations relative to what it produces in moderate ranges, presented the 
opposite pattern in the analysis of unproductive entrepreneurship. In my refined analysis of 
unproductive entrepreneurship, I find a consistent pattern of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural 
values leading to more unproductive entrepreneurship in low and high ranges of rules and 
regulations and those same values leading to relatively less unproductive entrepreneurship in the 
middle ranges of rules and regulations. These consistent results show the role of rules and 
regulations in discouraging unproductive entrepreneurship.  These stable patterns are primarily 
intriguing because of the low sample size used in this dissertation and particularly interesting 
because they hold true for both measures of unproductive entrepreneurship which are from two 
completely different data sources. 
 Specifically, in this additional analysis, property rights (H3b) as shown in model 42 of 
table 11 and model 47 of table 12, show that an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural 
values will lead to an increase in unproductive entrepreneurship when property rights are not 
well-defined (low ranges) or too well-defined (high ranges) relative to what it produces in 
moderate ranges. As shown in model 42 (Schneider measure) of table 11, the coefficient for the 
middle range (-0.049) is lower than either the lower range coefficient (0.039) or the higher range 
coefficient (0.073).  This holds true for the second measure of unproductive entrepreneurship as 
well. As shown in model 47 (Enterprise measure) of table 12, the coefficient for the middle range 
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(-0.260) is lower than either the lower range coefficient (-0.118) or the higher range coefficient (-
0.087).    
 The additional analysis of bankruptcy laws (H4b) and unproductive entrepreneurship are 
shown in model 43 of table 11 and model 48 of table 12, an increase in pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values will lead to an increase in unproductive entrepreneurship when bankruptcy 
laws are strict (low ranges) or too lenient (high ranges) for the entrepreneur relative to what it 
produces in moderate ranges. As shown in model 43 of table 11, the coefficient for the middle 
range (-0.319) is lower than either the lower range coefficient (-0.011) or the higher range 
coefficient (0.023). This holds true for the second measure of unproductive entrepreneurship as 
well. As shown in model 48 of table 12, the coefficient for the middle range (-0.771) is lower 
than either the lower range coefficient (0.075) or the higher range coefficient (0.213).    
 Trade policies show the same consistent patterns in the refined analysis. Model 44 of 
table 11 and model 49 of table 12, shows an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values 
will lead to an increase in unproductive entrepreneurship in conditions where trade policies are 
not open (low ranges) or very open (high ranges) relative to what it produces in moderate ranges.  
As shown in model 44 of table 11, the coefficient for the middle range (-0.019) is lower than 
either the lower range coefficient (0.048) or the higher range coefficient (0.055). This holds true 
for the second measure of unproductive entrepreneurship as well. As shown in model 49 of table 
12, the coefficient for the middle range (-0.296) is lower than either the lower range coefficient (-
0.108) or the higher range coefficient (-0.048).    
 Finally, labor market flexibility also shows the same patterns in the refined analysis. 
Model 45 of table 11 and model 50 of table 12, show an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-
cultural values will lead to an increase in unproductive entrepreneurship when labor markets are 
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not flexible (low ranges) or too flexible (high ranges) relative to what it produces in moderate 
ranges.  As shown in model 45 of table 11, the coefficient for the middle range (-0.065) is lower 
than either the lower range coefficient (0.022) or the higher range coefficient (0.028). This holds 
true for the second measure of unproductive entrepreneurship as well. As shown in model 50 of 
table 12, the coefficient for the middle range (-0.555) is lower than either the lower range 
coefficient (-0.289) or the higher range coefficient (-0.234).    
In sum, the additional analysis showed that relative to moderate ranges, extreme low or 
high ranges of rules and regulations steer the pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values away from 
productive entrepreneurship and toward unproductive entrepreneurship. This supports my second 
proposition that the closer to optimal the rules and regulations in a country the greater the impact 
of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on levels of productive entrepreneurship relative to 
unproductive entrepreneurship. It further refined proposition two by presenting that the most 
favorable mix of entrepreneurship actually derives not from the most well-defined property 
rights, most lenient bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur, most open trade policies or most 
flexible labor markets, but rather from moderate levels of those rules and regulations. These 
results lead me to several conclusions spanning across entrepreneurial theory, government 
policies and managerial implications for the firm.      
69 
 
CHAPTER 6– DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation investigated why the amount of productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship varies across countries. Drawing upon and integrating the socio-cultural 
literature with rules and regulations literature, I proposed that a country’s socio-cultural values 
and norms determine the likelihood of an individual undertaking entrepreneurial activity of any 
type, either productive or unproductive, while rules and regulations shift entrepreneurial activity 
toward productive or unproductive allocations. The proposed hypotheses were tested on total 
productive and total unproductive entrepreneurship activity in 25 countries during the period 
2004-2008.  
 This dissertation study extends both entrepreneurship and international business 
literatures, while providing better guidance to managers and policy makers. Additionally, this 
dissertation provided an empirical testing of Baumol’s pivotal piece “Entrepreneurship: 
Productive, unproductive and destructive,” in the Journal of Political Economy, (1990) which 
has been cited over 500 times (Web of Science) but, to my knowledge, empirically tested less 
than five times. One possible explanation for the lack of empirical exploration concerns the 
challenge in measuring the numerous variables (Sobel, 2008). Consequently, many researchers 
sidestep testing unproductive entrepreneurship and test the influence of a country’s institutional 
environment on productive entrepreneurship only (e.g., Aidis et al., 2008; Bjornskov and Foss, 
2008). This dissertation contributes to the advances of the few empirical studies on the allocation 
between productive and unproductive entrepreneurial efforts (Capelleras, et al., 2008; Murphy et 
al., 1991; Sobel, 2008). 
 My dissertation revealed that pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values drive both 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. In line with previous research, I find that 
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countries that teach their members to accept an ambiguous world (e.g., McGrath et al., 1992), 
have egalitarian value systems (e.g., Thompson 1967), support individuality (e.g., Shane, 1993), 
and have larger volumes of media coverage on entrepreneurship (e.g., Hindle and Klyver, 2007) 
will have greater levels of entrepreneurship.    
Moreover, I put forward that as the rules and regulations under examination in this 
dissertation become more optimal, in terms of providing the maximum ability for the productive 
entrepreneur to capture rents from his efforts at the minimal possible cost, the relationship 
between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and productive entrepreneurship will 
strengthen and the relationship between those same values and unproductive entrepreneurship 
will weaken. The results from this part of the analyses were strongest after my additional refined 
approach.  
The findings on the determinants of the allocation of entrepreneurship show that 
entrepreneurs do consider the costs they must incur to pursue entrepreneurship and the 
opportunity to capture rents from their efforts. This supports my second proposition that the 
closer to optimal the rules and regulations in a country the greater the impact of pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values on levels of productive entrepreneurship relative to 
unproductive entrepreneurship. It further refined my proposition two by showing that the most 
favorable mix of entrepreneurship actually came not from the most well-defined property rights, 
most lenient bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur, most open trade policies or most flexible 
labor markets, but rather from moderate levels of those rules and regulations. This complements 
and challenges the existing literature that the quality of the institutional environment in which an 
entrepreneur resides influences his allocation of entrepreneurial effort (Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008) by offering further insight into what is meant by institutional quality. 
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 First, the results show that when administrative barriers are high (above 12 procedures) 
there is a positive effect of pro-entrepreneurial socio cultural values on levels of unproductive 
entrepreneurship. However, when administrative barriers are low (less than 6 procedures) the 
effect of socio-cultural values on unproductive entrepreneurship flips from positive to negative.  
These findings are consistent with the public choice theory (Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971; 
Tullock 1967) that stricter regulation of entry is associated with inferior outcomes and minimal 
regulation will lead to superior outcomes, e.g., less unproductive entrepreneurship.  
 Second, in the analysis as property rights and enforcement of contracts became more-
well-defined an increase in pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values leads to decreases in both 
types of entrepreneurship – productive and unproductive.  However, the additional refined 
analysis showed that pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values lead to relatively less productive 
entrepreneurship and more unproductive entrepreneurship in low and high ranges of well-defined 
property rights and those same values lead to relatively more productive entrepreneurship and 
less unproductive entrepreneurship in the middle ranges of property rights.  
This suggests that the protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts have a 
negative effect on productive entrepreneurship and a positive effect on unproductive 
entrepreneurship when conditions are so poor that individuals are required to allocate effort away 
from productive activities in the effort to secure legally unprotected property (DeSoto, 1989).  In 
addition, if property rights become too well-defined then they are costly to enforce and will have 
an adverse effect on the productive entrepreneur who is running and protecting a registered firm. 
In line with the existing literature, the extent to which property rights are secure and contracts 
enforceable determines entrepreneurs’ rights to a newly established firm and rights to make 
exchanges in the market (e.g., Demsetz, 1967). However, if too costly to protect property then 
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the results may be detrimental to the entrepreneur. Accordingly, entrepreneurs may view well-
defined property rights and enforcement of contracts to be costly in the long-term and thus be 
persuaded away from allocating their efforts toward productive entrepreneurship. 
 The original analysis on lenient bankruptcy laws showed that as bankruptcy laws become 
more lenient for the entrepreneur in a country there was a weaker relationship between pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and productive entrepreneurship. This was the opposite of 
the predicted direction (positive). At first analysis, it appeared that increases in the leniency of 
bankruptcy laws lead to decreases in the amount of productive entrepreneurship. As an 
alternative, the additional investigation provided a more in-depth analysis of specifically how 
bankruptcy laws matter to the entrepreneur.  The more nuanced analysis showed that pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values lead to relatively less productive entrepreneurship and more 
unproductive entrepreneurship when bankruptcy laws are in either extreme and lead to relatively 
more productive entrepreneurship and less unproductive entrepreneurship in the middle ranges. 
This supports my hypothesis that the marginal effects of increases in socio-cultural pro-
entrepreneurial values increase productive entrepreneurship and decreases unproductive 
entrepreneurship when bankruptcy laws are in moderate ranges.     
 These results suggest that when investors evaluate the success of a potential venture, they 
base their decision on the commitment of the entrepreneur. As a result, countries where it is easy 
abandon a failing firm would provide fewer incentives for the productive entrepreneurs to 
commit to the long term success of the new venture and thus discourage outside investment 
because it is more risky for the financial backer. Conversely, bankruptcy laws that favor the 
financial backer too much will discourage the productive entrepreneur from investing in a new 
business because the risk of financial debt and hardship should the venture fail may be too costly 
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of an effort for the productive entrepreneur.  A more balanced approach where bankruptcy laws 
are neither too lenient nor too strict yields the best mix of productive entrepreneurial effort.     
 Fourth, I hypothesized that the freedom to exchange and experiment, within and across 
national boundaries, is essential to new combinations of resources in today’s globalized world. 
This led me to the prediction that more entrepreneurial activity would be in places where trade is 
the least restricted. My original findings did not find support for this prediction which led me to 
conclude that openness of trade policies is essential to the international entrepreneur but not the 
average entrepreneur. However, the additional refined analysis showed that pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values lead to relatively less productive entrepreneurship and more unproductive 
entrepreneurship when property rights are in either extreme and lead to relatively more 
productive entrepreneurship and less unproductive entrepreneurship in the middle ranges. This 
supports my hypothesis that the marginal effects of increases in socio-cultural pro-
entrepreneurial values increase productive entrepreneurship and decreases unproductive 
entrepreneurship when trade openness is in moderate ranges.     
 Fifth, I find in my original analysis that as labor markets become more flexible there is a 
weaker relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and unproductive 
entrepreneurship but no relationship between those same values and productive entrepreneurship. 
However, the refined analysis showed that pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values lead to 
relatively less productive entrepreneurship and more unproductive entrepreneurship when labor 
market flexibility are in either extreme and lead to relatively more productive entrepreneurship 
and less unproductive entrepreneurship in the middle ranges. Entrepreneurship requires the 
ability to effectively and efficiently manage human resources to act in accordance with 
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unforeseen demand and find the most welcoming environments to be labor markets that are not 
too flexible or stringent.   
 Thus, my findings show that the most favorable mix of entrepreneurship derives not from 
the most well-defined property rights, most lenient bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur, the 
most open trade policies nor most flexible labor markets, but rather from moderate levels of 
those rules and regulations. As previously stated, I made the conjecture, based on previous 
literature (e.g., Sobel, 2008), that the relationship would be linear and thus increases in rules and 
regulations would lead to greater outcomes (more productive and less unproductive).  However, 
upon further reflection, I recognize there are several literatures which suggest the effect of rules 
and regulations on the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and 
entrepreneurship to be non-linear.  
 For example, the principal agent model puts forward that one wants to minimize the sum 
of bonding costs, monitoring costs and the residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because at 
a certain point the marginal benefit of monitoring will become less than the marginal cost of 
monitoring. This logic may be applied to my second hypothesis on administrative barriers of 
entry as well as my sixth hypothesis on labor market flexibility.  For administrative barriers to 
entry there must be some level of administrative barriers because otherwise new firms are not 
monitored at all but if too administrative barriers to entry then they become detrimental to the 
entrepreneur because start-up costs would be too high. In terms of labor market flexibility if 
labor markets are not regulated then employees may suffer the consequences of an unmonitored 
employer but if labor markets become too regulated than they reach the point of too costly for 
the entrepreneur.    
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  Furthermore, the tragedy of the commons literature (Hardin, 2009) puts forward that 
under-defined property rights will harm the overall society and on the other spectrum the anti-
commons literature discusses that over-defined property rights will lead to gridlocks and stifling 
innovations (Somaya and Teece, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). Taken together, these literatures suggest 
a non-linear relationship for property rights and contract enforceability because you need 
property rights and the enforcement of contracts but if over-defined than it may be too costly to 
the entrepreneur.  
  Additionally, the literature on optimal breach of contracts (Barton, 1972 and Rogerson, 
1984) relates well to the findings on bankruptcy laws. There are two goals: expectation 
protection (the plaintiff should be put in as good a position as if the promise had been honored) 
and the incentive maintenance (the defendant should honor the promises) that guide the contract 
and determine the penalties if the contract is breached (Barton, 1972). Moreover, there should be 
a damage measure which provides reasonable assurance that the party will perform to the agreed 
upon contract (Rogerson, 1984). This logic leads to the prediction that if bankruptcy laws are in 
either extreme then they become too easy for the entrepreneur (if too lenient) or the lender (if too 
strict) to breach the contract which should result in less entrepreneurship for extreme levels and 
more entrepreneurship for moderate levels of bankruptcy laws.  
 Finally, the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) offers additional logic for 
a non-linear relationship. This theory states that increases in free trade can produce positive or 
negative results. If there are any other constraints on policies within a country then trade 
openness may not be beneficial. This logical would lead to a prediction of moderate ranges of 
trade openness to be the most favorable and to not assume that increases of trade openness 
always has positive results (more productive entrepreneurship).  
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 The findings of this dissertation offer implications for entrepreneurship and international 
business theory, policy makers, firm managers as well as opportunities for future research. First 
this dissertation adds to the entrepreneurship literature by integrating the socio-cultural literature 
with the rules and regulation literature to allow for variations in amount of entrepreneurs (the 
supply) as well as variations in the allocations (between productive or unproductive 
entrepreneurship). Separately each of these literatures provides only partial explanations for why 
levels of entrepreneurship vary across countries. Taken together researchers are better able to 
predict and explain the variation of the amount and allocation of entrepreneurship thus adding to 
our theoretical understanding of determinants of entrepreneurship.  
   Second, while Baumol’s (1990) work continues to provide the motivation for many 
entrepreneurship papers, his analysis did not offer researchers with a specific list of the key 
indicators that influence the allocation of entrepreneurial efforts (Bowen and Clercq, 2008). This 
omission has theoretical and empirical implications which are covered in this dissertation.  
Theoretically, I identified key indicators that match Baumol’s (1990) propositions in public 
interest theory, public choice theory, property rights, bankruptcy, international trade and labor 
market theories. The combination of these factors allowed for a better prediction and explanation 
in the variations of levels and allocation of entrepreneurship across countries. 
  Empirically, operationalizing measures to capture these factors improved the empirical 
domain of the current literature.  One of the reasons for the lack of empirical studies is that all 
three variables are essentially unobservable (Sobel, 2008). I operationalized productive 
entrepreneurship, unproductive entrepreneurship, and five rules and regulations variables which 
allowed for a more complete empirical test.   
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 One of the perplexing outcomes of the results was the original lack of effects for the rules 
and regulations hypotheses on productive entrepreneurship. At the first analysis, four out of the 
five institutional factors showed no effect on the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-
cultural values and productive entrepreneurship. This led to an early conclusion that future 
research should investigate where the productive entrepreneurial effort is going if not to more 
productive entrepreneurship. However, the refined analysis suggests that when regulations are at 
either extreme (high or low) then we observe pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values to lead to 
less productive entrepreneurship and more unproductive entrepreneurship and when in the 
middle ranges to lead to relatively more productive entrepreneurship and less unproductive 
entrepreneurship. This conclusion highlights the importance of improving rules and regulations 
but it does not answer the question of where the productive entrepreneurial effort is ending up, if 
not in starting a new firm (productive entrepreneurship). 
 One possible explanation is entrepreneurial people are working for productive 
entrepreneurs. In other words, the allocation of entrepreneurial efforts may not be fully captured 
by using the number of new business owners as the proxy for productive entrepreneurship. 
Additional empirical examinations should look beyond new business owner inception rates and 
investigate characteristics within the firm.  The individuals working in a new firm may be just as 
productively entrepreneurially as their bosses but not involved in the official registration of the 
firm or have the title of new business owner (e.g., joined the firm shortly after its inception). This 
is an important distinction that offers promising avenues for future research to looking within the 
firm for different types of productive entrepreneurship.  
 Third, this dissertation highlights the significance of the comparative approach to 
entrepreneurship. The findings show support for the importance of looking at entrepreneurship at 
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the country-level and taking into account both the socio-cultural values and the regulatory 
environment of a country to understand why there is variation in entrepreneurship around the 
globe. Precisely looking beyond just better institutions and unpacking specifically what types 
matter to productive entrepreneurship.  This dissertation put forward rules and regulations that 
provide the maximum ability for the productive entrepreneur to capture rents from his efforts at 
the minimal possible cost would yield the best results (more productive entrepreneurship relative 
to unproductive entrepreneurship). The refined analysis showed that the maximum ability to 
capture rents for efforts with minimal costs is found in the middle ranges, as opposed to either 
extreme, of institutional regulations.   
 Integrating international business and entrepreneurship theory, as done in this 
dissertation, broadens our understanding of entrepreneurship beyond the individual or firm to 
levels which have implications for economic growth. Comparative approaches are the foundation 
of international business theory and on the other hand less prevalent in entrepreneurship theory. 
One exception is the international entrepreneurship literature but its focuses are on the 
internationalization of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).  Accordingly, this dissertation 
offers a new lens to which international business and entrepreneurship can be combined.  
 As well as contributing to the academic literature, this paper gives value to practitioners 
by guiding policy makers and firm managers. Indeed, my results indicate that policies matter. 
There is a clear pattern that extreme ranges of rules and regulations yield bad results (less 
productive and more unproductive entrepreneurship) whereas middle ranges have the best results 
(more productive and less unproductive entrepreneurship). Rules and regulations in the middle 
ranges in a country strengthen the relationship between pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values 
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and levels of productive entrepreneurship and weaken the relationship between those same 
values and unproductive entrepreneurship. 
 The findings of this dissertation extend classic entrepreneurship (new firm creation) into 
corporate entrepreneurship as well as intrapreneurship and thus provide several managerial 
implications. First, a primary strategic question that managers face today is where to locate their 
R&D facilities. In a globalized world, firms are scanning for locations that not only cut costs but 
provide high quality human capital. When a manager faces the challenges on where to locate he 
must consider both the pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values, to ensure an entrepreneurial 
culture, as well as the costs and benefits of doing business in a country as determined by rules 
and regulations.  This study suggests that the more appealing places to locate an R&D facility are 
in countries with the combination of pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values and middle ranges 
of rule and regulation.  
The conclusions of this dissertation further extend to recent international business 
literature on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Globalization created a world where 
previously unattainable economies of scale became more assessable (Birkinshaw, 1995) and 
taking advantage of these opportunities required a fundamental change in the way top 
management viewed the role of their foreign subsidiaries.  The multinational subsidiary in 
current research is now conceptualized as a “semi-autonomous entity with entrepreneurial 
potential” (Birkinshaw et al., 2005 pg.229). Entrepreneurial potential is defined as the extent to 
which a subsidiary may engage in entrepreneurial behavior. Thus managers seek to try and 
predict how MNCs can better tap into their foreign subsidiaries entrepreneurial possibilities. 
Adding to this research, the location of the subsidiary will greatly influence the extent to which 
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the firm will be entrepreneurial because it is embedded in the socio-cultural values and norms of 
its society.   
  Furthermore, some companies pride themselves in having an entrepreneurial 
organizational culture and thus seek to invest in highly motivated and innovative employees to 
match. For example, Google strives “to maintain the open culture often associated with startups, 
in which everyone is a hands-on contributor and feels comfortable sharing ideas and opinions” 
(google.com). Google is well known for permitting employees to spend up to 20% of their 
workweek on projects not related to the other 80% of their normal responsibilities.  Last year, 
Apple followed suit by introducing the “Blue Sky” initiative that gave a small group of 
employees a few weeks ‘off’ to develop their own engineering projects (Wall Street Journal). 
Applying these ideas to the global economy it is clear that the best employees for Google, Apple 
and other innovative firms are located in places that are considered to have pro-entrepreneurial 
socio-cultural values and the rules and regulations of these countries will determine if that effort 
is allocated productively.  
 The findings of this dissertation offer many possible extensions for future research. First, 
this dissertation examined the productive and unproductive allocation of entrepreneurial efforts 
across 25 countries using data from a variety of sources.  An empirical analysis of this size in 
terms of the number of countries investigated and measurement has not yet, to my knowledge, 
been done. It would be further appealing to examine specific within country factors as possible 
determinants of the allocation of entrepreneurial effort. One way to accomplish this is to conduct 
in-depth interviews with local managers regarding the types of entrepreneurial activity within 
their country.   
 Second, there are limitations to measuring entrepreneurship. This dissertation used the 
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dataset from GEM to measure productive entrepreneurship which is consistent with technical 
standards in social science research (GEM, 2008) but has limitations. First ideally GEM would 
have larger sample sizes and longer interview times with participants to allow for a more detailed 
precision of sample (Reynolds et al., 2005). While limited, GEM is currently the world’s leader 
and most comprehensive data of productive entrepreneurship and continues to improve in scope 
and precision.  
 Third, there were several variables that theory suggested would be important 
determinants in the allocation of entrepreneurial effort but data availability were lacking. One 
primary example is capital markets. Entrepreneurs are individuals who not only identify an 
opportunity worth pursuing but act on it (McMullen and Sheperd, 2006). Since financing 
constraints may act as hindrance for a potential entrepreneur to act, access to capital may 
influence the entrepreneur’s decision to engage in entrepreneurship of any kind.  If future studies 
can identify data sources that offer comparative analysis of capital markets then this would be an 
improvement to this current study.  
 Likewise, this dissertation examines the conditions for an entrepreneur to get started and 
the costs and benefits of becoming a productive or unproductive entrepreneur. One of those 
benefits, not included in this dissertation is opportunity for firm growth. An entrepreneur will be 
more likely to be productive when there are lower barriers to growth in terms of recouping the 
capital investment (Eesley, working paper 2012). If future studies can identify comparative data 
sources to capture potential for future firm growth then this would be an additional improvement.  
  Fourth, future research may want to examine entrepreneurs beyond inception and 
investigate survival rates. Namely, recent literature has shown that entrepreneurs driven by 
opportunity will experience longer firm survival rates than those driven by necessity (e.g., 
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Reynolds et al., 2005).  Nonetheless, future research should be cautious of how necessity 
entrepreneurship is defined. In GEM’s database necessity entrepreneurship is defined as 
individuals having no other means than entrepreneurship for making a living which implicitly 
assumes productive entrepreneurship to be the only option. As described in this dissertation, 
researchers should also take into consider that unproductive entrepreneurship, not included in the 
GEM database, is also an option for the potential entrepreneur.   
 Fifth, one of the challenges of country-level comparative studies is bringing the unit of 
analysis down to the firm; particularly the importance of these concepts to managers. One 
valuable extension of this research is to apply and test these same ideas within the boundaries of 
the firm. An in-depth analysis of an entrepreneurial firm that changes its way of operating (rules 
and regulations) would be a good test to see if the ideas are generalizable to the firm. A thought-
provoking question is if a pro-entrepreneurial firm (e.g. Google) would see different types of 
entrepreneurial behavior (productive vs. unproductive) after shifts in company rules. 
Unproductive entrepreneurial behavior within a firm may be defined as counterproductive 
behavior (e.g. time wasting).    
 Another avenue for firm-level research related to the findings of this dissertation is in 
human resource management by examining how employees judge fairness in company policies 
and the resulting productive or unproductive behaviors in response to the perception of fairness. 
Company-level policies may influence individual employees’ actions just as country-level 
policies influence individual entrepreneur actions in a manner that corresponds with not favoring 
the firm or the employee to an extreme. 
 Finally, the findings of this dissertation call for future research in two emerging research 
streams. First, despite decades of research, a justification for why rates of entrepreneurial activity 
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differ across countries is still underexplored (Hechavarria & Reynolds, 2009; Wennekers et al., 
2005). There is a need for studies that employ country-level framework conditions and culture on 
explaining entrepreneurial activity (Stenholm et al., 2013).  This dissertation fills part of this gap 
in the literature.  
 Second, the field of management has recently shown renewed interest in the informal 
economy as an important research avenue for extending our understanding of the firm’s 
competitive advantages, capabilities, resources, innovative profiles, and nature of managerial 
function and resource-allocation process and the function of the corporation as a social 
mechanism for value creation (McGahan, 2012).  This dissertation contributes to this interest in 
providing important insights for mainstream theories that have previously been limited to the 
registered (official) firm.  
 The main contribution of this dissertation was the integration of the socio-cultural 
literature with the rules and regulations literature to better explain why there are varying amounts 
of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship around the globe. First, four socio-cultural 
values were identified and combined into an index to test if more pro-entrepreneurial values lead 
to overall levels of entrepreneurship. The results showed that both productive and unproductive 
entrepreneurship result from the same pro-entrepreneurial socio-cultural values. Doing so 
extended the socio-cultural literature into the allocation of entrepreneurship literature.  
Three additional inter-related contributions were made. Building off of Baumol’s (1990) 
broad reference to rules and regulations a specific set of institutional factors that steer the 
allocation of entrepreneurial resources were established.  The refined analysis shows that pro-
entrepreneurial socio-cultural values lead to relatively less productive entrepreneurship and more 
unproductive entrepreneurship in low and high ranges of rules and regulations and those same 
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values lead to relatively more productive entrepreneurship and less unproductive 
entrepreneurship in the middle ranges of rules and regulations. My findings show that the most 
favorable mix of entrepreneurship actually derives not from the most well-defined property 
rights, most lenient bankruptcy laws for the entrepreneur, the most open trade policies nor most 
flexible labor markets, but rather from moderate levels of those rules and regulations. 
 
 
  
   
  
85 
 
Figures, Tables and Graphs 
Figure 1: Dissertation Model 
Productive 
Entrepreneurship 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship 
H1: Entrepreneurial 
Social Cultural Values 
Tolerance for Ambiguity  
 
Egalitarian Value 
System 
 
Acceptance of 
Individuality 
 
Portrayal by Media 
Rules and Regulations  
H2: Barriers to Entry 
H3: Property Rights/Contracts 
H4: Bankruptcy Laws 
H5: Trade Freedom 
H6: Labor Market Flexibility 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
86 
 
  Table 1 - Code plan of the empirical part of Dissertation Overview 
 
Topic Variable Type 
Corresponding 
Hypotheses 
Number of Countries Years Source 
Productive Entrepreneurship 
Dependent 
Variable All (a) 25 2004-2008 GEM 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship 
Dependent 
Variable All (b) 25 2004-2008 
World Bank from Schneider, F., 
Buehn, A & M, Claudio E.(2010).IEJ 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship 
Dependent 
Variable All (b) 12 
one year within 
2007-2009 World Bank Enterprise Survey 
Socio-cultural Values - 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 
Independent 
Variable H1(a) 25 1998  World Value Survey 
Socio-cultural Values- 
Egalitarian Value Systems 
Independent 
Variable H1(b) 
25 1998 
World Value Survey 
Socio-cultural Values - 
Acceptance of Individuality 
Independent 
Variable H1(c) 
25 1998 
World Value Survey 
Socio-cultural Values - 
Portrayal of Entrepreneurship 
by Media 
Independent 
Variable H1(d) 25 
2004-2008 
(lagged by 1yr) GEM 
Rules and Regulations- Red 
Tape 
Moderating 
Variable H2 24 (missing Sweden) 2004-2008 WDI- Doing Business Project 
Rules and Regulations- 
Property Rights and Contracts 
Moderating 
Variable H3 25 2004-2008 Heritage Foundation 
Rules and Regulations- 
Leniency of Bankruptcy Laws  
Moderating 
Variable H4 25 2004-2008 Calculated from World Bank Data 
Rules and Regulations -  
Trade 
Moderating 
Variable H5 25 2004-2008 Heritage Foundation 
Rules and Regulations - Labor 
Markets Flexibility 
Moderating 
Variable H6 25 2004-2008 Heritage Foundation 
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Table 2 - Code plan of the empirical part of Dissertation Question and Coding 
   
Topic Question Asked Coding 
Productive 
Entrepreneurship 
Do you Own/manage a running business that has paid wages (new business) or no paid wages yet 
(nascent) for more than three months, but not more than 42 months 
Percentage of those that qualified as either new 
business owner or nascent business owner 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship n/a SEM equation  Shadow economy as percentage of GDP 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship Is the informal economy a major obstacle? Percentage of yes (1) answers 
Tolerance for 
Ambiguity 
Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this 
scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree 
completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can 
choose any number in between. Sentences:  Ideas stood test of time better vs. New ideas better 
 (1) Ideas that stood test of time are generally best  to 
(10) New ideas are generally better than old on 
Egalitarian 
Value Systems 
Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people 
feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 
means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control you feel you have over the way your life turns out Scale  ranging from (1)  none at all to (10) a great deal 
Acceptance of 
Individuality 
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially important? Autonomy Index = (Religion/Faith + Obedience) – 
(Independence + Determination/Perseverance) 
Scores range (-2) to (+2) depending on selected 
qualities; reverse coded to reflect High Autonomy 
Media- 
Entrepreneurship  In your country, you often see stories in the public media bout successful new businesses Percentage of population that said yes 
Red Tape Reverse code of:  Number of procedures required to start a firm 
Reverse code of number of procedures to reflect high 
as lowest amount of procedures 
Property 
Rights/Contracts Property Rights component index Scores range from 0 to 100. 
Ease of Failing 
100 cents - rate of recovery as cents per dollar by others (creditors, tax officials, employees)= 
Fresh start rate  0-100 cents, Calculated 
Trade The minimum tariff is zero percent the maximum is 50%.; Scores are converted to 100-point scale Scores range from 0 to 100. 
Labor Markets 
Six quantitative factors are equally weighted: Ratio of minimum wage to the average value added 
per worker, Hindrance to hiring additional workers, Rigidity of hours, Difficulty of firing 
redundant employees, Legally mandated notice period, and Mandatory severance pay. 
Scores range 0 to 100; in constructing the labor 
freedom score, each of the six factors is converted to a 
scale of 0 to 100 
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Table 3 
 
Variable Type 
 
Hypotheses Countries Years Mean Std. dev. Min Max Source 
Productive 
Entrepreneurship Dependent  All 25 2004-2008 8.82 5.16 1.48 31.64 GEM 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship Dependent All 25 2004-2008 24.24 11.22 8.8 56 
World Bank from 
Schneider et al., 2010 
Unproductive 
Entrepreneurship Dependent All 12 
2007, 2008 or 
2009 33.34 10.18 17.29 51.87 
World Bank Enterprise 
Survey 
Socio-cultural Values 
Aggregate Measure  Independent H1 25 1998 -0.08 2.57 -6.27 7.76 
World Value Survey & 
GEM 
Admin Barriers to Entry Moderating H2 24 2004-2008 12.32 4.42 2 19 
WDI- Doing Business 
Project 
Property Rights and 
Contracts Moderating H3 25 2004-2008 62.65 23.58 20 90 Heritage Foundation 
Bankruptcy Laws  Moderating H4 25 2004-2008 50.97 28.93 5.59 99.9 
Calculated from World 
Bank Data 
Trade Freedom Moderating H5 25 2004-2008 74.82 12.02 23.6 89.2 Heritage Foundation 
Labor Market Flexibility Moderating H6 25 2004-2008 64.75 15.99 38.8 97.8 Heritage Foundation 
Job Initiative Taking Control All 25 2004-2008 0.47 0.12 0.22 0.83 World Value Survey 
Competition is Good Control All 25 2004-2008 7.39 0.57 6.28 8.53 World Value Survey 
Population: Working 
Age Control All 25 2004-2008 52.61 11.12 39.29 105.7 WDI 
Government Corruption  Control  All 25 2004-2008 4.22 2.42 0.3 7.9 
Transparency 
International (TI) 
GNI growth (annual %) Control  All 25 2004-2008 4.91 3.07 -4 13.27 WDI 
Year 2008  Control All 25 2004-2008 0.2 0.4 0 1 Dummy 
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Table 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Productive Entrepreneurship  1.000 
2. Unproductive Entrepreneurship  0.182 1.000 
3. Unproductive Entrepreneurship (es)5 0.583 0.539 1.000 
4. Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 0.722 0.264 0.647 1.000 
5. Admin Barriers to Entry -0.379 -0.569 -0.498 -0.266 1.000 
6. Property Rights and Contract  -0.228 -0.584 -0.037 -0.078 0.691 1.000 
7. Bankruptcy Laws 0.193 0.575 -0.047 0.182 -0.578 -0.586 1.000 
8. Trade Freedom -0.213 -0.260 -0.281 -0.195 0.513 0.560 -0.504 1.000 
9. Labor Flexibility 0.178 -0.204 0.217 0.006 0.119 0.309 -0.173 0.062 1.000 
10. Initiative Taking is Important -0.058 -0.310 0.095 0.092 0.256 0.325 -0.126 0.211 -0.056 1.000 
11. Competition is Important 0.161 -0.031 -0.340 0.185 -0.048 -0.280 0.266 -0.318 -0.019 -0.054 1.000 
12. GNI growth (annual %) 0.273 0.185 0.047 0.165 -0.350 -0.622 0.468 -0.475 -0.242 -0.113 0.328 1.000 
13. Population: Working Age 0.484 0.409 0.322 0.388 -0.450 -0.230 0.163 -0.171 0.183 0.069 0.294 0.132 1.000 
14. Government Corruption 0.249 0.622 -0.004 0.112 -0.724 -0.929 0.724 -0.616 -0.261 -0.309 0.291 0.592 0.265 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Enterprise Survey Data measure (12 Developing Countries) 
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Table 5:  OLS Estimates on Productive Entrepreneurship  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 1.253*** 1.314 2.296*** 2.404*** 2.335 1.223 
(5.57) (1.44) (4.70) (6.40) (1.50) (0.85) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values 
(H2) -0.005 
(-0.07) 
Property Rights*Values (H3) -0.018* 
(-2.10) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4) -0.028** 
(-3.49) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5) -0.014 
(-0.69) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6) 0.001 
(0.02) 
Admin Barriers to Entry -0.498* -0.138 -0.134 -0.016 -0.701** -0.092 -0.139 
(-2.51) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.08) (-2.92) (-0.39) (-0.68) 
Property Rights and Contracts -0.092 -0.104 -0.105 -0.107 -0.119 -0.109 -0.104 
(-0.79) (-1.74) (-1.80) (-2.00) (-2.05) (-1.89) (-1.68) 
Bankruptcy Laws 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.0238 0.003 0.011 0.008 
(0.05) (0.38) (0.37) (1.04) (0.14) (0.52) (0.33) 
Trade Freedom 0.039 0.031 0.030 -0.008  0.053  -0.010 0.031 
(0.67) (0.57) (0.52) (-0.15) (1.01) (-0.08) (0.59) 
Labor Flexibility 0.110 0.100** 0.090** 0.092** 0.137*** 0.096** 0.099** 
(1.87) (3.70) (3.67) (3.19) (4.81) (3.39) (3.05) 
Initiative Taking in a Job is 
Important -3.647 -0.998 -0.877 1.178 2.308 -0.882 -1.017 
(-0.42) (-0.22) (-0.18) (0.31) (0.56) (-0.21) (-0.23) 
Competition is Important 1.187 0.0514 0.042 -0.221 0.017 -0.109 0.049 
(0.82) (0.07) (0.06) (-0.28) (0.02) (-0.14) (0.06) 
GNI growth (annual %) 0.293 0.084 0.084 0.081 0.076 0.074  0.085 
(1.11) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.54) (0.41) (0.47) 
Year 2008 1.312 1.741** 1.735** 1.891** 1.646* 1.904** 1.741** 
(1.98) (3.11) (3.27) (3.37) (2.80) (3.00) (3.10) 
Population: Working Age 0.228 -0.078 -0.080 -0.182 -0.010 -0.122 -0.077 
(1.15) (-0.56) (-0.55) (-1.19) (-0.08) (-0.73) (-0.47) 
Government Corruption -1.114 -0.753 -0.767 -0.875 -1.426 -0.863 -0.753 
(-1.19) (-0.99) (-0.96) (-1.23) (-1.94) (-1.17) (-0.98) 
Constant -4.624 14.65 14.89 22.54 17.14 20.94 14.62 
(-0.24) (1.22) (1.19) (1.92) (1.37) (1.40) (1.22) 
Number of Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
R-squared 0.3357 0.7078 0.7078 0.7311 0.7636 0.7124 0.7078 
Prob > F 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
t statistics in parentheses 
="* p<0.05 
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Table 6:  OLS Estimates on Unproductive Entrepreneurship (Schneider) 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 0.750† 3.397† -0.567 1.038 -1.778 -2.599 
(1.92) (1.77) (-0.51) (0.62) (-0.35) (-0.87) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2) -0.232 
(-1.44) 
Property Rights*Values (H3) 0.0220 
(1.17) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4) -0.007  
(-0.16) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5) 0.033  
(0.51) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6) 0.050 
(1.20) 
Admin Barriers to Entry 0.986 0.853 1.041** 0.673 0.721 0.777 0.743 
(1.54) (1.59) (2.82) (1.30) (1.10) (1.62) (1.39) 
Property Rights and Contracts -0.208 -0.158 -0.208* -0.142 -0.163 -0.152 -0.166 
(-1.95) (-1.86) (-2.53) (-1.66) (-1.48) (-1.92) (-1.87) 
Bankruptcy Laws 0.184* 0.134 0.119 0.116 0.134 0.131 0.112 
(2.16) (1.72) (1.56) (1.61) (1.73) (1.70) (1.42) 
Trade Freedom 0.057  0.089 0.061  0.095 0.087  0.107 0.042  
(0.94) (0.79) (0.54) (0.88) (0.77) (1.01) (0.39) 
Labor Flexibility -0.0973 -0.130* -0.126** -0.132* -0.121 -0.130* -0.117* 
(-1.59) (-2.71) (-2.80) (-2.76) (-1.44) (-2.66) (-2.44) 
Initiative Taking in a Job is Important -20.12* -17.66** -10.98 -19.74** -17.12** -17.40** -19.06** 
(-2.67) (-3.33) (-1.45) (-2.92) (-3.05) (-3.58) (-3.41) 
Competition is Important -7.545 -4.433 -4.761 -4.247 -4.526 -4.441 -5.336 
(-1.86) (-1.26) (-1.44) (-1.19) (-1.16) (-1.24) (-1.33) 
GNI growth (annual %) -0.577 -1.006* -1.086* -0.949* -1.012* -0.978* -0.886 
(-1.14) (-2.26) (-2.65) (-2.13) (-2.25) (-2.10) (-1.83) 
Population: Working Age 0.496** 0.331* 0.256 0.376* 0.344 0.340* 0.323 
(3.20) (2.17) (1.57) (2.38) (1.52) (2.08) (1.97) 
Government Corruption 0.417 1.236 0.850 1.282 1.055 1.307 1.106 
(0.33) (1.34) (0.96) (1.41) (0.58) (1.50) (1.18) 
Constant 58.01 41.21 48.91* 39.87 43.24 39.70 54.41 
(2.04) (1.76) (2.11) (1.74) (1.40) (1.85) (1.90) 
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.3357 0.6957 0.723 0.7043 0.6965 0.6987 0.7096 
Prob > F 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
="* p<0.05 
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Table 7:  OLS Estimates on Unproductive Entrepreneurship (Enterprise) 
Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 0.106 8.765** 6.631*** 4.058 6.480 16.47** 
(0.09) (3.29) (4.88) (1.24) (2.00) (3.63) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2) -0.803* 
(-2.65) 
Property Rights*Values (H3) -0.141** 
(-3.68) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4) -0.075 
(-1.21) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5) -0.090 
(-1.85) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6) -0.247** 
(-3.25) 
Admin Barriers to Entry -1.419 -2.133 -1.112 -1.674** -3.175 -1.772 -0.874 
(-2.06) (-1.76) (-1.88) (-4.09) (-2.14) (-1.70) (-1.03) 
Property Rights and Contracts -0.166 0.0947 -0.420 -0.609 0.270 -0.167 -0.482 
(-0.52) (0.29) (-1.20) (-1.83) (0.92) (-0.49) (-1.38) 
Bankruptcy Laws -0.114 -0.307 -0.290 -0.056 -0.225 -0.228 -0.068  
(-1.00) (-1.30) (-2.02) (-0.79) (-1.02) (-1.15) (-0.42) 
Trade Freedom -0.0039 0.147 -0.0746 -0.163 0.256 -0.119 -0.174 
(-0.02) (1.02) (-0.77) (-1.70) (1.39) (-0.69) (-1.48) 
Labor Flexibility 0.174 0.314 0.270 0.973** 0.371 0.544 0.848* 
(0.72) (1.22) (1.62) (3.15) (1.53) (1.51) (2.28) 
Initiative Taking in a Job is Important 16.85 25.26 42.28 73.07** 32.53 34.43 57.75 
(0.97) (1.04) (2.13) (3.28) (1.41) (1.24) (1.94) 
Competition is Important -6.826 -1.887 -10.77* -7.236* -0.338 -4.152 2.397 
(-1.19) (-0.38) (-2.76) (-2.96) (-0.06) (-0.80) (0.47) 
GNI growth (annual %) 0.540 0.936 0.132 0.342 1.178* 0.741 -0.079  
(1.09) (2.02) (0.34) (1.43) (2.28) (1.67) (-0.17) 
Population: Working Age -0.039 -0.153 -0.140 -0.723* -0.122 -0.260 -0.175 
(-0.16) (-0.91) (-1.29) (-2.91) (-0.66) (-1.33) (-1.13) 
Government Corruption -1.646 1.460 -3.948 -3.274 2.511 -0.199 -3.686 
(-0.40) (0.31) (-1.02) (-1.16) (0.60) (-0.05) (-1.00) 
Constant 106.0 38.97 157.7* 112.6* 1.001 76.40 21.18 
(2.06) (0.74) (2.58) (3.10) (0.02) (1.62) (0.47) 
Number of Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
R-squared 0.5463 0.6976 0.8633 0.9133 0.7213 0.7363 0.8031 
t statistics in parentheses 
="* p<0.05 
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Table 8: Robustness Test: Fixed Effects Estimates on Productive Entrepreneurship 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 
1.252*** 1.218* 2.327*** 2.370*** 2.547* 1.178 
 
(8.38) (2.05) (4.60) (6.70) (2.16) (0.86) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values 
(H2) 0.00292 
 
(0.06) 
Property Rights*Values (H3) -0.0186* 
 
(-2.22) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4) -0.0272** 
 
(-3.43) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5) -0.0171 
 
(-1.11) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6) 0.00103 
 
(0.05) 
Admin Barriers to Entry -0.492* -0.147 -0.149 -0.0213 -0.694** -0.0926 -0.151 
 
(-2.50) (-0.96) (-0.93) (-0.13) (-3.27) (-0.57) (-0.89) 
Property Rights and Contracts -0.0952 -0.107* -0.107 -0.112* -0.121* -0.114* -0.107* 
 
(-1.37) (-2.07) (-2.00) (-2.25) (-2.56) (-2.19) (-2.05) 
Bankruptcy Laws 0.00308 0.00955 0.00967 0.0270 0.00469 0.0138 0.00894 
 
(0.11) (0.43) (0.43) (1.19) (0.23) (0.62) (0.36) 
Trade Freedom 0.0297 0.0106 0.0111 -0.0332 0.0359 -0.0356 0.0110 
 
(0.48) (0.20) (0.20) (-0.60) (0.73) (-0.52) (0.20) 
Labor Flexibility 0.111** 0.0983*** 0.0982*** 0.0915*** 0.136*** 0.0941*** 0.0989*** 
 
(3.14) (4.09) (4.04) (3.91) (5.55) (3.87) (3.65) 
Initiative Taking in a Job is 
Important -3.510 -0.983 -1.049 1.240 2.232 -0.849 -1.028 
 
(-0.81) (-0.30) (-0.30) (0.38) (0.72) (-0.26) (-0.30) 
Competition is Important 1.190 0.170 0.176 -0.104 0.118 -0.0116 0.163 
 
(1.21) (0.23) (0.23) (-0.14) (0.17) (-0.02) (0.21) 
GNI growth (annual %) 0.276 0.0458 0.0457 0.0390 0.0445 0.0309 0.0481 
 
(1.19) (0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.29) (0.18) (0.27) 
Population: Working Age 0.226* -0.0854 -0.0847 -0.192 -0.0174 -0.138 -0.0819 
 
(2.08) (-0.96) (-0.93) (-1.95) (-0.21) (-1.37) (-0.74) 
Government Corruption -1.162 -0.896 -0.889 -1.059 -1.521* -1.048 -0.896 
(-1.47) (-1.39) (-1.34) (-1.69) (-2.47) (-1.59) (-1.38) 
Constant -3.377 17.19 17.07 25.82* 19.18 25.03 17.09 
 
(-0.24) (1.55) (1.50) (2.27) (1.90) (1.91) (1.51) 
Number of Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
t statistics in parentheses 
="* p<0.05 
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Table 9: Robustness Test: Fixed Effects Estimates on Unproductive Entrepreneurship 
(Schneider) 
Model 
29 
Model 
30 
Model 
31 
Model 
32 
Model 
33 
Model 
34 
Model 
35 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 0.742* 3.380* -0.617 1.018 -1.559 -2.730 
 
(2.11) (2.54) (-0.50) (1.09) (-0.40) (-1.15) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2) -0.231* 
 
(-2.05) 
Property Rights*Values (H3) 0.023 
 
(1.16) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4) -0.007 
 
(-0.32) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5) 0.030  
 
(0.60) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6) 0.050 
 
(1.48) 
Admin Barriers to Entry 0.996** 0.840* 1.030** 0.652 0.714 0.772* 0.722* 
 
(2.99) (2.41) (2.95) (1.70) (1.36) (2.09) (2.05) 
Property Rights and Contracts -0.210 -0.157 -0.206 -0.141 -0.162 -0.152 -0.167 
 
(-1.95) (-1.38) (-1.83) (-1.23) (-1.39) (-1.32) (-1.48) 
Bankruptcy Laws 
0.187**
* 0.132* 0.117* 0.114* 0.132* 0.130* 0.111* 
 
(4.15) (2.66) (2.42) (2.21) (2.63) (2.59) (2.16) 
Trade Freedom 0.054 0.077 0.056  0.081  0.0764 0.094 0.021 
 
(0.57) (0.56) (0.42) (0.59) (0.55) (0.66) (0.15) 
Labor Flexibility -0.0979 -0.130* -0.125* -0.131* -0.120* -0.130* -0.116* 
 
(-1.87) (-2.60) (-2.61) (-2.64) (-2.07) (-2.58) (-2.31) 
Initiative Taking in a Job is Important 
-
20.23** -17.68* -10.93 -19.85* -17.14* -17.46* -19.26* 
 
(-3.13) (-2.34) (-1.36) (-2.56) (-2.19) (-2.29) (-2.55) 
Competition is Important 
-
7.591**
* -4.341* -4.691* -4.136* -4.432* -4.355* 
-
5.244** 
 
(-4.81) (-2.41) (-2.68) (-2.29) (-2.40) (-2.40) (-2.79) 
GNI growth (annual %) 
-0.575 -1.034* 
-
1.107** -0.979* -1.039* -1.007* -0.918* 
 
(-1.52) (-2.52) (-2.79) (-2.38) (-2.51) (-2.43) (-2.23) 
Population: Working Age 
0.499**
* 0.327** 0.251* 0.374** 0.340** 0.336** 0.322** 
 
(5.73) (3.04) (2.27) (3.26) (2.93) (3.07) (3.03) 
Government Corruption 0.372 1.213 0.870 1.247 1.045 1.273 1.024 
(0.31) (0.94) (0.69) (0.97) (0.74) (0.98) (0.80) 
Constant 58.61** 42.01 49.14* 40.82 43.88 40.64 56.34* 
 
(3.20) (1.91) (2.28) (1.86) (1.91) (1.82) (2.37) 
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
t statistics in parentheses 
="* p<0.05 
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Table 10: Additional OLS Estimates on Productive Entrepreneurship [with low, medium, 
high ranges]  
Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 0.787 2.685*** 2.291*** 2.000 0.658 
(0.77) (4.23) (6.15) (1.39) (0.29) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); Lower third -0.007 
(-0.09) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); middle range 0.051 
(0.37) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); Upper third 0.102 
(0.91) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); Lower third -0.023* 
(-2.29) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); middle range -0.016 
(-0.76) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); Upper third -0.036 + 
(-1.82) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); Lower third -0.038** 
(-3.16) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); middle range 0.028 
(0.49) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); Upper third -0.026** 
(-3.11) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); Lower third -0.012 
(-0.64) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); middle range -0.009 
(-0.33) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); Upper third -0.008 
(-0.38) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); Lower third 0.005 
(0.20) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); middle range 0.012 
(0.22) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); Upper third 0.011 
(0.31) 
Admin Barriers to entry -0.323 0.033 -0.817** -0.114 -0.174 
(-1.32) (0.15) (-3.03) (-0.45) (-0.76) 
Property Rights and Contracts -0.077 -0.122* -0.140* -0.102 -0.100 
(-1.40) (-2.16) (-2.80) (-1.69) (-1.52) 
Bankruptcy Laws 0.011 0.033 -0.006 0.011 0.004 
(0.57) (1.33) (-0.24) (0.52) (0.17) 
Trade Freedom 0.053 -0.019 0.090 0.005 0.041 
(0.79) (-0.31) (1.33) (0.06) (0.56) 
Labor Flexibility 0.077* 0.101** 0.135*** 0.090* 0.095** 
(2.45) (3.25) (5.16) (2.75) (2.82) 
Initiative Taking in a Job is Important 1.189 0.916 4.150 -0.0776 -0.550 
(0.27) (0.23) (1.04) (-0.02) (-0.13) 
Competitions is Important 0.873 -0.643 0.267 0.113 0.217 
(0.93) (-0.60) (0.34) (0.12) (0.23) 
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Table 10 (cont.) 
 
GNI growth (annual %) 0.180 -0.007 0.102 0.109 0.133 
(1.00) (-0.04) (0.71) (0.58) (0.70) 
Population: Working Age -0.070 -0.246 0.026 -0.113 -0.053 
(-0.47) (-1.53) (0.21) (-0.64) (-0.29) 
Government Corruption -0.852 -0.952 -1.795* -0.873 -0.786 
(-1.28) (-1.39) (-2.80) (-1.24) (-1.09) 
Year 2008 1.622** 2.052** 1.599* 1.830** 1.707** 
(3.47) (3.30) (2.67) (3.23) (3.33) 
Constant 6.110 29.99 13.01 17.38 11.24 
(0.46) (2.04) (0.99) (1.13) (0.73) 
Number of Observations 67 67 67 67 67 
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Formal test for the differences among the coefficients for Table 10* 
Hypothesis 2a (Administrative Barriers to entry) Hypothesis 5a (Trade Policies) 
test Admin_Values1=Admin_Values2 test Trade_Values1=Trade_Values2 
( 1)  Admin_Values1 - Admin_Values2 = 0 ( 1)  Trade_Values1 - Trade_Values2 = 0 
   
Prob > F =    0.6239 Prob > F =    0.8563 
    
test Admin_Values2=Admin_Values3 test Trade_Values2=Trade_Values3 
( 1)  Admin_Values2 - Admin_Values3 = 0 ( 1)  Trade_Values2 - Trade_Values3 = 0 
 
Prob > F =    0.6157 Prob > F =    0.9572 
    
Hypothesis 3a (Property Rights) Hypothesis 6a (Labor Market Flexibility) 
test Property_Values1=Property_Values2 test Labor_Values1=Labor_Values2 
( 1)  Property_Values1 - Property_Values2 = 0 ( 1)  Labor_Values1 - Labor_Values2 = 0 
  
Prob > F =    0.7717 Prob > F =    0.8528 
    
test Property_Values2=Property_Values3 test Labor_Values2=Labor_Values3 
( 1)  Property_Values2 - Property_Values3 = 0 ( 1)  Labor_Values2 - Labor_Values3 = 0 
Prob > F =    0.4447 Prob > F =    0.9762 
  
Hypothesis 4a (Bankruptcy Laws) 
test Bankrupt_Values1=Bankrupt_Values2 
( 1)  Bankrupt_Values1 - Bankrupt_Values2 = 0 
Prob > F =    0.2828 
  
test Bankrupt_Values2=Bankrupt_Values3 
( 1)  Bankrupt_Values2 - Bankrupt_Values3 = 0 
Prob > F =    0.3821 
 
*The formal test for the differences among the coefficients for high, medium and low for dependent variable productive 
entrepreneurship shows that the coefficients do not differ in a statistically significant way but there does appears to be a pattern 
across all measures. 
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Table 11: Additional OLS Estimates on Unproductive (Schneider) Entrepreneurship [with 
low, medium, high ranges]  
Model 41 Model 42 Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 4.145 -0.832 2.015 -2.034 0.241 
(2.04) (-0.70) (1.12) (-0.45) (0.07) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); Lower third -0.166 
(-0.87) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); middle range -0.503** 
(-3.07) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); Upper third -0.337 
(-1.40) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); Lower third 0.039+ 
(1.90) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); middle range -0.050 
(-1.51) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); Upper third 0.073 
(1.58) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); Lower third -0.011 
(-0.45) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); middle range -0.319* 
(-2.16) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); Upper third 0.023 
(0.51) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); Lower third 0.048 
(0.84) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); middle range -0.019 
(-0.30) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); Upper third 0.055 
(0.89) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); Lower third 0.022 
(0.51) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); middle range -0.065 
(-0.89) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); Upper third 0.028 
(0.61) 
Admin Barriers to entry 1.291** 0.717 1.091* 0.909 0.957 
(3.21) (1.38) (2.48) (1.78) (1.88) 
Property Rights and Contracts -0.204* -0.0685 -0.126 -0.105 -0.114 
(-2.46) (-0.74) (-1.34) (-1.13) (-1.09) 
Bankruptcy Laws 0.111 0.0757 0.0990 0.119 0.113 
(1.62) (1.04) (1.32) (1.64) (1.53) 
Trade Freedom 0.0236 0.0340 -0.0223 0.0522 0.00611 
(0.23) (0.41) (-0.28) (0.64) (0.06) 
Labor Flexibility -0.0746 -0.127 -0.0740 -0.107 -0.0870 
(-1.15) (-1.71) (-0.82) (-1.44) (-0.94) 
Initiative Taking in a Job is Important -14.29 -19.18** -10.79 -15.58* -16.38* 
(-1.70) (-3.23) (-1.70) (-2.62) (-2.32) 
Competitions is Important -6.238 -4.077 -4.379 -4.810 -5.333 
(-1.69) (-0.96) (-1.26) (-1.21) (-1.25) 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
 
 
GNI growth (annual %) -1.147** -0.731* -0.769** -0.885* -0.883* 
(-3.01) (-2.36) (-3.53) (-2.56) (-2.56) 
Population: Working Age 0.263 0.467** 0.261 0.355* 0.325 
(1.49) (3.20) (1.38) (2.09) (1.84) 
Government Corruption 1.377 2.052* 1.663 1.854* 1.828* 
(1.72) (2.71) (1.53) (2.54) (2.40) 
Constant 60.46* 34.34 43.86 40.47 48.94 
(2.21) (1.29) (1.54) (1.62) (1.57) 
Number of Observations 58 58 58 58 58 
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Formal test for the differences among the coefficients for Table 11* 
Hypothesis 2b (Administrative Barriers to entry) 
 
Hypothesis 5b (Trade Policies) 
test Admin_Values1=Admin_Values2 
 
test Trade_Values1=Trade_Values2 
( 1)  Admin_Values1 - Admin_Values2 = 0 
 
( 1)  Trade_Values1 - Trade_Values2 = 0 
 Prob > F =    0.1083 
 
Prob > F =    0.0876 
  
 
  
test Admin_Values2=Admin_Values3 
 
test Trade_Values2=Trade_Values3 
( 1)  Admin_Values2 - Admin_Values3 = 0 
 
( 1)  Trade_Values2 - Trade_Values3 = 0 
 Prob > F =    0.3807 
 
Prob > F =    0.0132 
  
 
  
Hypothesis 3b (Property Rights) 
 
Hypothesis 6b (Labor Market Flexibility) 
test Property_Values1=Property_Values2 
 
test Labor_Values1=Labor_Values2 
( 1)  Property_Values1 - Property_Values2 = 0 
 
( 1)  Labor_Values1 - Labor_Values2 = 0 
 Prob > F =    0.0292 
 
Prob > F =    0.1224 
  
 
  
test Property_Values2=Property_Values3 
 
test Labor_Values2=Labor_Values3 
( 1)  Property_Values2 - Property_Values3 = 0 
 
( 1)  Labor_Values2 - Labor_Values3 = 0 
 
  
Prob > F =    0.0009 
 
Prob > F =    0.0295 
  
  Hypothesis 4b (Bankruptcy Laws) 
  test Bankrupt_Values1=Bankrupt_Values2 
  ( 1)  Bankrupt_Values1 - Bankrupt_Values2 = 0 
  
  Prob > F =    0.0296 
    
  test Bankrupt_Values2=Bankrupt_Values3 
  ( 1)  Bankrupt_Values2 - Bankrupt_Values3 = 0 
  
  Prob > F =    0.0098 
   
*The formal test for the differences among the coefficients for high, medium and low for dependent variable unproductive 
entrepreneurship shows that the coefficients differ in statistically significant way for some but not all hypotheses. Specifically, 
there appears to be a pattern for trade barriers and labor market flexibility and there is significant support for differing 
coefficients for property rights and bankruptcy laws . 
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Table 12: Additional OLS Estimates on Unproductive Entrepreneurship (enterprise) [with 
low, medium, high ranges]  
 
Model 46 Model 47 Model 48 Model 49 Model 50 
Pro-Entrepreneurial Values (H1) 8.998*** 6.079*** -5.131 7.024* 19.33*** 
 
(4.18) (4.86) (-1.80) (2.65) (9.39) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); Lower third -0.634*** 
 
(-4.48) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); middle range -1.799*** 
 
(-4.27) 
Admin Barriers to Entry*Values (H2); Upper third -0.629* 
 
(-2.63) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); Lower third -0.118*** 
 
(-5.31) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); middle range -0.260*** 
 
(-4.43) 
Property Rights*Values (H3); Upper third -0.087* 
 
(-2.34) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); Lower third 0.075 
 
(1.71) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); middle range -0.771*** 
 
(-4.24) 
Bankruptcy Laws*Values (H4); Upper third 0.213** 
 
(3.07) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); Lower third -0.108* 
 
(-2.82) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); middle range -0.296** 
 
(-3.40) 
Trade Freedom*Values (H5); Upper third -0.048  
 
(-1.32) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); Lower third -0.289*** 
 
(-9.31) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); middle range -0.555*** 
 
(-10.20) 
Labor Flexibility*Values (H6); Upper third -0.234*** 
 
(-7.65) 
Admin Barriers to entry -1.948* -2.240*** -1.275 -2.916*** -1.902*** 
 
(-2.60) (-4.84) (-1.64) (-4.90) (-5.78) 
Property Rights and Contracts 0.171 -0.241 0.282 0.204 -0.015 
 
(0.70) (-0.97) (1.16) (0.67) (-0.11) 
Bankruptcy Laws -0.297** -0.122 -0.660*** -0.267* -0.0864 
 
(-3.43) (-1.39) (-4.40) (-2.55) (-1.47) 
Trade Freedom 0.057 0.002 0.198 -0.018 -0.033 
 
(0.36) (0.01) (1.26) (-0.09) (-0.37) 
Labor Flexibility 0.0415 0.697** -0.275 0.350 0.564*** 
 
(0.22) (3.72) (-1.41) (1.53) (4.96) 
Imitative Taking in a Job is Important 26.17 60.44** 21.80 44.67* 62.05*** 
 
(1.47) (3.85) (1.44) (2.20) (6.23) 
Competitions is Important -16.71** -11.47** -16.82** -12.76* -6.934** 
 
(-3.75) (-3.74) (-3.80) (-2.83) (-3.15) 
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Table 12 (cont.) 
 
 
GNI growth (annual %) 0.543 0.642* 0.994* 1.109** 0.261 
 
(1.48) (2.19) (2.79) (2.97) (1.20) 
Population: Working Age 0.117 -0.440* 0.151 -0.042  0.083 
 
(0.72) (-2.67) (1.00) (-0.22) (0.93) 
Government Corruption 2.744 0.740 3.884 3.589 1.320 
 
(0.93) (0.29) (1.27) (1.00) (0.76) 
Constant 151.6*** 112.7*** 159.8** 107.3** 48.71** 
 
(4.67) (5.43) (3.68) (3.63) (3.90) 
Number of Observations 33 33 33 33 33 
 
 
Formal test for the differences among the coefficients for Table 12 
Hypothesis 2b (Administrative Barriers to entry) 
 
test Bankrupt_Values2=Bankrupt_Values3 
test Admin_Values1=Admin_Values2 
 
( 1)  Bankrupt_Values2 - Bankrupt_Values3 = 0 
( 1)  Admin_Values1 - Admin_Values2 = 0 
 
  
  
 
Prob > F =    0.0001 
Prob > F =    0.0161 
    
 
Hypothesis 5b (Trade Policies) 
test Admin_Values2=Admin_Values3 
 
test Trade_Values1=Trade_Values2 
( 1)  Admin_Values2 - Admin_Values3 = 0 
 
( 1)  Trade_Values1 - Trade_Values2 = 0 
  
 
   
Prob > F =    0.0037 
 
Prob > F =    0.0508 
  
 
  
Hypothesis 3b (Property Rights) 
 
test Trade_Values2=Trade_Values3 
test Property_Values1=Property_Values2 
 
( 1)  Trade_Values2 - Trade_Values3 = 0 
( 1)  Property_Values1 - Property_Values2 = 0 
 
  
  
 
Prob > F =    0.0034 
Prob > F =    0.0525 
 
  
  
 
Hypothesis 6b (Labor Market Flexibility) 
test Property_Values2=Property_Values3 
 
test Labor_Values1=Labor_Values2 
( 1)  Property_Values2 - Property_Values3 = 0 
 
( 1)  Labor_Values1 - Labor_Values2 = 0 
  
 
  
Prob > F =    0.0083 
 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
  
 
  
Hypothesis 4b (Bankruptcy Laws) 
 
test Labor_Values2=Labor_Values3 
test Bankrupt_Values1=Bankrupt_Values2 
 
( 1)  Labor_Values2 - Labor_Values3 = 0 
( 1)  Bankrupt_Values1 - Bankrupt_Values2 = 0 
 
  
  
 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
Prob > F =    0.0005 
  
*The formal test for the differences among the coefficients for high, medium and low for dependent variable unproductive 
entrepreneurship (enterprise) shows that the coefficients differ in statistically significant way. 
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Appendix A: Other Methods for Measuring Informal Economy 
Type Name Description Advantages Disadvantages Assumptions Limitations 
Direct 
Detailed 
Survey 
Voluntary replies to survey Detailed Info 
Data availability and 
reliability 
All respondents cooperate 
with full disclosure 
Narrowness of coverage: Limited to 
what respondents choose to disclose 
Direct 
Tax 
Auditing 
Discrepancy between income 
declared for taxes and that 
measured by selective checks 
Actual 
Numbers for 
calculation 
Data availability and 
reliability 
Confidence in fiscal 
auditing program; effective 
in selective checks 
Possibly bias sample of population 
(toward compliance), tax audit 
reflects only discovered portion  
Indirect 
The physical 
input 
(electricity) 
method 
Discrepancy between 
electricity consumption 
(overall economic activity) 
and GDP (official economic 
activity) 
Simplicity in 
calculating and 
data 
availability  
Calculations of the ratio of 
hidden economy to official 
appear not possible (see 
Lackó, 2000 for examples) 
Electricity and GDP 
elasticity are usually close 
to one. By having a proxy 
measurement for the overall 
economy (electricity input) 
and subtracting it from 
estimates of official GDP, 
derives an estimate of 
unofficial GDP  
Not all informal activities require 
electricity, technical progress has 
made the use of electricity more 
efficient, may be considerable 
differences or changes in elasticity 
of electricity/GDP across countries 
and time 
Indirect 
Income-
Expenditures 
Discrepancy between income 
and expenditures statistics 
Simplicity in 
calculating 
Data availability for both: 
independent estimate of 
expenditures and income 
National accounting income 
measure of GNP should be 
equal to expenditures 
measures of GNP (any gaps 
= informal economy) 
National accounts statistics have 
strong incentives to min. published 
discrepancy between expenditures 
and income then the data must be 
the initial (pre-published) data 
Indirect Labor Force 
Discrepancy between official 
and actual labor force; based 
on total labor force 
Simplicity in 
calculating 
Its limited by its 
assumption 
Labor force participation is 
constant so decreasing 
official rates in participation 
in actual labor force are 
indicators of growing 
informal 
May be other causes in a decline in 
participation in actual labor market 
(e.g.,  person reasons like staying 
home with family) 
Indirect 
Transaction 
Approach 
Discrepancy between official 
GNP and total nominal GNP 
Use Fisher's 
quantity 
equation to get 
an exact 
number 
Uses a base year where 
there is no informal 
economy but this is not the 
case, no base year exists; 
and assumes all variation 
in ratio is due to informal 
economy 
Constant relation over time 
between volume of 
transactions and official 
GNP 
Requires considerable amount of 
data (Giles, 1999) 
Indirect 
Currency 
Demand 
Ratio between currency and 
demand deposits 
One of most 
common 
approaches 
Assuming same velocity 
of money exists across 
countries is a big 
assumption 
Informal economy occurs in 
cash, increase in demand 
for cash means an increase 
in informal economy 
Not all transactions in hidden 
economy are in cash, increase in 
currency demand deposits can be 
due to slowdown in demand deposits 
rather than currency 
This spreadsheet is based off of work of Schneider, F. (2002). Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries around the World. Working Paper. 
